The relationship between China and North Korea deteriorated after both had their leadership transition in 2012. On the one hand, China was annoyed by North Korea's provocations; Beijing imposed sanctions and reduced its support to North Korea to alleviate its entrapment fear. On the other hand, facing diplomatic pressure from both China and the U.S., Pyongyang committed provocations against both countries. After the Singapore Summit, both China and North Korea solidified their alliance and highlighted the "special relationship" they have had since the Korean War. Based on the development of the Sino-DPRK alliance during the Xi Jinping era, this paper aims to discuss the following questions: First, why does North Korea frequently commit provocations without considering China's opposition? Second, why is their relationship fluctuate throughout the period? More specifically, why are they sometimes de-linked, whereas sometimes they align? Finally, why have both sides solidified their alliance relationship when the tense relationship between the U.S. and North Korea alleviated after the Singapore Summit? To address these questions, I adopt Glenn H. Snyder's alliance theory as a research approach to explore the alliance game and the adversary game within the Sino-DPRK alliance. Facing China's vague support, North Korea created a conflict to keep China's support in the alliance game to alleviate its fear of abandonment.