- 期刊
Greco-Turkish Cyprus Dispute and Britain's Decision for Turkey to be included in the Middle East Command for the Political Stabilization of NATO, 1949-1950
摘要
On 4 April 1949, NATO was established with the ultimate aim to counter the encroachment of the Soviet Union in various countries especially in the Europe continent. Greece and Turkey were among the early victims that suffered from the aggression of the Soviet Union, but both were not invited to join NATO. Britain, one of the prominent founding countries of NATO, strongly opposed these two countries from joining NATO. The existing literature on the reason why Britain was reluctant to invite Turkey to join NATO was because of its plan to have Turkey in a forthcoming Middle East Command (MEC) plan. This study however will demonstrate otherwise. This study seeks to show that the decision of Britain to have Turkey in the MEC was not a reason but the MEC was merely used as a means to ensure Turkey and its security partner, Greece, stay outside of NATO. The method used in this study is a qualitative method that scrutinizes and analyses British archival records such as the Foreign Office Papers (FO 371), the Cabinet Office Papers (CAB), the Defence Ministry Papers (DEFE), the House of Commons Parliamentary Debate (HANSARD), the Private Papers of Bevin (FO 800), the Prime Minister's Office Papers (PREM 8), and the Colonial Office Papers (CO). This study found that Britain, or specifically its Foreign Secretary which was Ernest Bevin used the MEC as a means to avoid Turkey and also Greece from joining NATO, while conflict between these countries over Cyprus was the underlying cause of both omissions from NATO. In the justification of Bevin, the problem between Turkey and Greece because of Cyprus would disturb the organization which was just beginning to find its feet. Therefore, the decision to put Turkey in the MEC instead of NATO was due to ensure the political stabilization of NATO.