多個標的物拍賣制度之研究

An Essay on the Theory of Multi-Unit Auction

沈維民(William W. Sheng) ； 李重君(Gare Lee)

《Asia Pacific Management Review》 3卷1期 (1998/06) Pp. 49-58

https://doi.org/10.6126/APMR.1998.3.1.03

摘要

在標的物不具次級市場之前提下，若限制每位競標者只能投一個標、且每一標僅能申購一個單位，本研究發現多個標的物拍賣制度將具備下列的特性：（1）若拍賣者採用「單一價格制」，則競標者的最佳投標價格就等於其隱藏價格;若拍賣者採用「差別價格制」則競標者的最佳投標價格會低於其隱藏價格。（2）在討論單一價格制或差別價格制會帶給競標者較大的期望效用時，其結果將取決於競標者個人之效用函數與風險偏好。（3）拍賣者在拍賣進行之前，就必須決定採用單一價格制或差別價格制，但他在決定採用何種拍賣制度時，卻無法得知何種拍賣制度將會帶給他較大的期望收入。

關鍵字

差別價格制 ； 單一價格制 ； 隱藏價格

並列摘要

When each bidder can buy at most one unit and the objects auctioned don't have secondary markets, the multi-unit auction has the following characteristics: (i) Under the competitive auction, the optimal bidding price equals the bidder's reservation price, but under the discriminative auction, the optimal bidding price is lower than the bidder's reservation price. (ii) Whether the bidder's expected utility is greater under the competitive auction than under the discriminative auction, or vice versa, depends on the bidder's utility function and risk attitude. (iii) Not until the auction is finished can the seller make sure whether the competitive auction or the discriminative auction brings him more expected revenues.

並列關鍵字

discriminative auction ； competitive auction ； reservation price

參考文獻

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