股權結構、公司價值與內部監督機制－上海證券市場實證研究

Ownership Structure, Corporate Performance and Insider's Control: An Empirical Study on Shanghai Stock Market

葉銀華(Yin-Hua Yeh) ； 馬君梅(Chun-Mei Ma)

《Asia Pacific Management Review》 4卷1期 (1999/03) Pp. 37-50

https://doi.org/10.6126/APMR.1999.4.1.04

摘要

本文基於股權結構理論與內部監督機制，探討上海證券市場股權結構對公司價值與績效的影響。實證結果發現，由於固有股無法有效執行內部人監督功能並且產生雙層代理問題，因此當國家持股比率愈高，公司價值與績效愈低；此負向關係在大公司群較為明顯。相對而言，法人股（創業者）為公司實質內部監督者，因此當法人持股比率愈高，公司價值與績效愈佳；此正向關係在大公司群較為明顯。再者，當股權結構主要集中於非國有股，則可提昇公司的價值與績效。另外，針對B股市場而言，本文發現當法人與外資持股比率增加時，境外投資者會給予較高評價。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 代理理論 ； 內部人監督 ； 上海證券市場

並列摘要

This study investigates the impact of ownership structure into the corporate performance on Shanghai stock market basing on the ownership structure theory and insider's control mechanism. The empirical results suggest that stated governance do not present effective insider's control mechanism, and exhibit dual agency problems The higher shareholding of state governance is, the lower the corporate performance is, and this phenomenon is apparent in large corporations. In contrast, the legal entity as the real insider, therefore, the higher shareholding of legal entity, the higher the corporate performance is, and this phenomenon is also apparent in large corporations. Further, when the ownership structure concentrates on the non-state governance, the corporate performance is enhanced. In addition, this study found in the B shares market, the offshore investors will value more highly for those companies with higher shareholdings of legal entity and foreign investors.

並列關鍵字

ownership structure ； agency theory ； insider's control ； Shanghai stock market

參考文獻

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