Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, Compensation, and CEO Turnover in Taiwan

Ying-Fen Lin ； Victor Wei-Chi Liu

《Asia Pacific Management Review》 9卷4期 (2004/08) Pp. 603-619

https://doi.org/10.6126/APMR.2004.9.4.03

並列摘要

This paper looks at 309 samples from the listed manufacturing companies in Taiwan, and determines the relationship between the performance of companies, internal control mechanisms, compensation, and CEO turnover by employing a logistic model. The analytical results are as follows: A. CEO turnover when a company's performance is low is an effective internal control mechanism for reducing the agency problem in Taiwanese companies. B. The control of outside blockholders over a CEO in a company internal governance mechanism plays an important role when CEO replacement occurs.

並列關鍵字

Turnover ； Corporate governance ； Compensation

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