產權、分稅制與地方政府行為─中國大陸「土地財政」之分析

本文分析中國大陸「土地財政」的起因與影響。兩種制度安排與土地財政興起有關：一是土地產權制度，二是分稅制改革。首先，現行土地產權制度賦予地方政府對土地的實質控制權，使地方政府可以低成本徵收與變更土地；其次，分稅制改革將城市土地收入和相關的營業稅劃歸地方管理。準此，地方政府一方面低價轉讓工業用地，以獲得增值稅和企業所得稅；另一方面又藉由對城市土地的壟斷地位，汲取商住用地的高額溢價和相關稅收。

關鍵字

中國大陸；土地財政；地方政府；產權制度；分稅制改革

並列摘要

The main purpose of the paper is to elucidate the causes and significance of ”land finance” in China. Two important institutional arrangements are related to the rise of land finance. One is property rights with respect to land, and the other is the tax-sharing system (TSS). On one hand, land-based institutions in transitional China have placed residual land rights under the control of local governments. This has given local authorities monopoly rights over land and power to obtain land and change land-use. The 1994 TSS reform, meanwhile, turned land revenues and business taxes over to the authority of local governments. Consequently, property rights, land policies, and the TSS reform have connected local fiscal revenues with the relevant income derived from land transactions. This has given rise to land finance. Local governments use several means to obtain revenues. First, local authorities are able to expropriate farm land with low transaction costs. Second, local governments sell land in industrial parks at low prices in order to attract investment. Meanwhile, they sell commercial and residential land at exorbitant prices through auctions. Moreover, state-owned land is often mortgaged to banks for enormous sums of money. Land finance, thus, has important effects on local revenues, social order and China's macroeconomic stability.