蔣介石、毛澤東、甘迺迪與1962年臺海危機

1962年臺海緊張期間，蔣介石總統基於中國大陸情勢不穩定，準備反攻大陸。在1954年共同防禦條約的義務之下，美國支持臺灣防衛，但除非兩國同意，才可對中共採取攻勢性的軍事行動。1962年6月，美國與中共在華沙大使級談判中，卻達成一項共同阻止蔣介石軍事行動的默契。甘迺迪政府在1961年古巴豬邏灣事件失敗之後，對以秘密行動推翻共黨政權的支持極為謹慎。在沒有中共明顯立即垮臺的具體證據之下，甘迺迪政府對蔣介石總統有關中共情勢之分析不具信心。美國雖同意展示防衛臺灣與金馬的決心，但不支持蔣介石反攻大陸，促使中共政權垮臺的計畫。

關鍵字

蔣介石；毛澤東；甘迺迪；反攻大陸；臺海危機

並列摘要

During the 1962 Taiwan Strait tension, President Chiang Kai-shek was preparing his military for a counter-attack in the midst of the turmoil in the PRC. The US supported the ROC under the obligations of the 1954 mutual defense treaty; however, it ruled out provocative military actions against the Chinese Communists unless a prior agreement was reached. In June 1962, the US and the PRC, through ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, reached a tacit understanding thereby bringing an end to Chiang's military preparations. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the Kennedy administration was cautious in undertaking covert actions overseas against communist regimes. Without hard evidence of the imminent collapse of Communist China, the US did not share President Chiang's confidence over the assessment of the situation in China. The US committed to the protection of the Quemoy and Matsu islands but stopped short of supporting Chiang's grand strategy of bringing about the collapse of the Chinese Communist regime.