病毒毒性演化之「賽局理論」分析及策略

Game-theoretic Analysis upon Virulence Evolution of Communicative Virus

陳博彥(Bor-Yann Chen) ； 劉雁方(Yen-Fang Liu) ； 黃種瑋(Chung-Wei Huang)

《宜蘭技術學報》 9期工學專輯 (2002/12) Pp. 121-126

https://doi.org/10.6179/nit.bce.2002.09.21

摘要

根據動態而非靜態賽局所演化之「納許均衡」顯示，病毒之「減毒作用」及宿主之「技巧改進」為「宿主-寄生蟲」消長之合理表現。因「納許均衡」而演化出之「合作結局」乃基於物種共存永續經營之考量。宿主經由其「技巧改進」來訴求一無病毒存在之環境以利正常生長；同時，病毒選擇採用較低毒性策略以維持宿主生存活性以利其自身之存活。病毒之「減毒」作用增強此二元物種之共存，因此得到緩和毒性之基因表達結果。此策略性賽局顯然闡述病毒毒性之變化；根據此結果，更可推論人口族群面臨傳染性病毒威脅之應對策略。

關鍵字

賽局理論 ； 納許均衡 ； 減毒作用 ； 技巧改進

並列摘要

According to Nash equilibrium evolved in a dynamic, not static game, it is indicated that virulence reduction of viruses and skill improvement of hosts as a reasonable outcome to direct evolution of host-parasitic virus relationship. This cooperation situation evolved as a Nash equilibrium is basically under consideration of a long-term sustainable development strategy for species coexistence. A host demands a virus-free environment by skill improvement for normal growth. Meanwhile, parasitic virus chooses less virulent strategy to maintain hostviability for its survival. Virulence reduction of communicative virus species enhances coexistence of both species; thus, a moderate virulence is resulted. This strategic game obviously indicates evolutionary dynamics of virulence. According to this, a corresponding strategy of human population in response to the threats of communicative virus can be anticipated.

並列關鍵字

Game theory ； Nash equilibrium ； Virulence reduction ； Skill improvement