行政及政策類委託研究計畫適用政府採購法問題之探討：代理人理論觀點

The Problems of Contracting-out Administration and Policy Project under Government Procurement Act: Perspective of Agent Theory

郭昱瑩(Yu-Ying Kuo) ； 洪綾君(Ling-Chun Hung)

《競爭力評論》 15期 (2012/03) Pp. 7-40

https://doi.org/10.30068/CR.201203.0001

摘要

為因應加入世界貿易組織的需求，政府採購法（以下簡稱採購法）於民國88年頒布實施，此後，研究發展的委託計畫即被納入採購法的條文中，也就是政府在委託外界進行政策研究時，需要遵循採購法的所有程序及規範，這些相關研究的委託目前歸屬於研究發展類之採購，並一般以「行政及政策類委託計畫」統稱之。本研究以委託－代理人（principal-agent）理論檢視採購法頒布後，對研究發展之行政及政策類研究委託計畫之規範，以及其可能產生的影響與風險。首先討論在招標、決標及履約各階段，行政及政策類根據現行法令規範可能產生的風險，繼而利用文獻回顧與次級資料分析外，輔以深度訪談以及焦點座談方法瞭解學術界之相關研發人員及政府採購人員之實際看法。研究發現資訊不對稱、逆向選擇以及道德風險皆分別出現在行政及政策類研究委託計畫的各個採購階段。最後依據研究結果提出建議，除了利用不同政策工具減低各種委託－代理人風險外，長期應考量研究發展特性，讓研究發展之採購在採購法中另成專章規範之。

關鍵字

政府採購法 ； 行政及政策類委託研究計畫 ； 委託－代理人理論

並列摘要

In order to meet the requirement of fairness and transparency in public procurement, Taiwan enacted ”Government Procurement Act” in 1998 and implemented this act since 1999. However, whether administration and policy contracting-out research fits the scope and regulations of Government Procurement Act has long been controversial. This paper, by virtue of in-depth interviews to 35 interviewees and 5-round focus groups, 4-6 participants each, explored problems of contracting-out administration and policy projects from the perspective of agent theory. The findings indicated that there were problems of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard during the process of public bidding, bidding review and selection as well as contract management. It is suggested to contract out projects to leading experts or institutions, establish a complete database of experts and scholars, place the university department as a unit of research team, raise reviewing fee, encourage the share of intellectual property between research team and government agencies, and make flexible appropriation, adjustable expenditure and consistent reimbursement system.

並列關鍵字

Government Procurement Act ； Administration and Policy Contracting-out Research ； Principal-agent theory