公司治理除了能夠降低控制股東操縱資訊的機會,提升企業揭露資訊的透明度之外,亦會影響資本市場分析師對於企業未來前景的看法及盈餘的預期。本研究之目的旨在探討公司治理的良窳對於分析師預測之影響;研究中採用多元回歸分析,檢定企業的公司治理對於分析師預測誤差與離散性的影響。在控制相關變數後,本研究發現分析師預測誤差及離散性會受到控制股東所掌握董監事席次比率的影響;當控制股東所掌握董監席次比率愈大時,會提高控制股東操縱資訊的誘因,導致資訊的可靠性降低,因而增加分析師的預測誤差及個別分析師間預測之不一致性(即預測離散性會增加)。再者,當控制股東所掌握的投票權比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時,個別分析師間預測之不一致性會提高。這些結果均支援「控制股東的財富侵佔」會造成企業的資訊品質降低,並進一步影響分析師的預測結果;且同時支持Lang, Lins and Miller(2004)的發現,公司治理機制較弱的企業,控制股東有誘因隱匿或操縱資訊,使得這類企業較不受到分析師的關注,而這類企業的分析師預測誤差通常也較大。
Corporate governance influences the degree of information disclosure transparency, and hence affects the expectation of financial analyst on corporate perspectives. In this study, we explore the relationship between corporate governance and analyst's forecasts. By adopting multiple regression approach, the influence of corporate governance on analyst's forecast error and dispersion were carefully examined. The findings indicate that, first, board of directors and supervisors owned by controlling stockholder was positively associated with analyst's forecast error and dispersion; as the proportion of controlling stockholder on board of directors and supervisors increased, the analyst's forecast error and dispersion were also increased. Secondly, the divergence between the voting rights and cash flow rights of controlling stockholder was also found positively associated with forecast dispersion. These findings provide some evidences about the linkage between the distortion of corporate governance and manipulation of financial information, which would decrease the predictability of future earnings.