美國奧巴馬政府的金融改革─解析2010金融改革與消費者保護法

Obama's Banking Reform-Decoding Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010

石人仁(Jen-Jen Shih)

《台灣金融財務季刊》 13卷4期 (2012/12) Pp. 1-25

https://doi.org/10.6985/TBFQ.201212.0001

摘要

本文嘗試解析奧巴馬政府2010年金融改革Dodd-Frank Act美國學界及實務的各種爭論。對照我政府自遷台以來之金融政策，Dodd-Frank Act係以改革納稅大眾救市，而加強對太大以致於不能倒（too big to fail）金融監理為主軸。美國1999年Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act金融服務現代化後，其金融控股公司（FHC）及各種金融創新產品獨步全球，其董監經理人如索羅斯在新興市場，掀起各類金融風暴，劫貧濟富並從中獲取鉅額暴利，而2008年金融危機則可視為流彈誤射美國，華爾街本身受創之超級風暴。本文以行政監理及市場機制分析Dodd-Frank Act，認為Dodd-Frank Act一方面要監理太大以致於不能倒之金融機構，一方面要追求股東利益最大化，維持金融創新競爭力，取捨之間，因傳統存款銀行和投資銀行的區分範疇已不存在，Dodd-Frank Act欲架構一個金融機構導彈預警系統，監督金融系統重要之機構（Systemically Important Financial Institutions, SIFIs），而美國多層金融監理，如何認定系統性風險（system risk）及太大以致於不能倒（too big to fail）之銀行及非銀行（nonbank）法令規章相當繁密造成金融監理成本過大，非常不適合台灣的金融主管機關採用。本文贊同歐盟財長Barnier董監經理薪酬之意見，建議從根本消弭董監經理過度尋利之誘因。本文結論建議加強公司治理等市場機制，對董監經理薪酬參考FSB Principles and Standards做限制，而各種繁密行政監理法令對經濟規模小之我國銀行並不利，因太大以致於不能倒（too big to fail）反較易轉嫁監理費用，但歐盟信用評等草案與Dodd-Frank Act之消費者保護機制，甚值參酌，宜適度加強我國行政監理法令以保護消費者對應國際化金融創新下複雜之金融產品。

關鍵字

董監經理人薪酬 ； 公司治理 ； 信用評等 ； 金融創新與金融穩定

並列摘要

After 1949, Taiwan has always utilized bail-out as the exit policy for troubled depository institutions. The deliberation of Dodd-Frank Act in the States invites our re-examining this long-contested issue. The backdrop of Dodd-Frank Act is a public outcry over the taxpayer's bailout. The Dodd-Frank Act heavily relies on complicated regulatory frameworks to govern the ”system risk” of ”too big to fail” institutions, banks and non-banks alike. Yet, this complicated, all-inclusive, and reams of new rules not only leads to the delay of implementation, but also indicates the broader underpinning quandary: The needs for safe and sound banking similar to the 1933 Glass-Steagall legitimacy; and the demands for financial innovation, maximum shareholder profits after the 1999 financial holding company (FHC) era. These innovations and FHC's aggressive, exorbitant profit-seeking have been demonstrated in the 1997 Asian Financial crisis which, was actively enlightened by Soros's quick kill. The 2008 US Sub-Prime debacle could be another such example (by mistake). The Article concludes by propounding more strenuous regulations on executive compensations for curbing exorbitant profit-seeking incentives. The paper calls for the enhancement of the market mechanisms, such as corporate governance and FSB Principles and Standards. The complicated regulatory frameworks only lead to, however, an undesirable, unexpected consequence: The economic scale renders the too-big-to-fail less costs sensitive than the smaller banking groups. Again, the EC draft on credit rating and Dodd-Frank Act's consumer protection might be worthwhile considering.

並列關鍵字

Financial Reform ； Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 ； FSB Principles and Standards ； Executive Compensations ； Corporate Governance ； Credit Rating ； Financial Innovation and Safety and Soundness of Banking

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