限制員工權利新股、董事委員會與實質盈餘管理：以台灣上市櫃公司為例

本文以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討採行「限制員工權利新股」制度是否會影響公司進行實質盈餘管理；並進一步考量監察人、審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重疊比例所帶來的監督能力提升是否可以對前述關聯性產生抑制效果。除此之外，也在額外分析中，以應計盈餘管理替代實質盈餘管理，並進行前述議題研究。實證結果發現：「限制員工權利新股」制度的股份基礎獎酬強度與公司進行「實質盈餘管理」幅度並沒有呈現顯著正向關係；然而卻與公司進行「應計盈餘管理」幅度呈現顯著正向關係，本研究以利益收斂假說來推論前述實證結果可能的理由。除此之外，監察人、審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重疊比例對於公司進行「實質盈餘管理」幅度亦或是「應計盈餘管理」幅度都沒有顯著抑制效果。然而，監察人、審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重疊比例越高，且「限制員工權利新股」制度中的股份基礎獎酬強度越強時，公司的「實質盈餘管理」幅度亦或是「應計盈餘管理」幅度都會顯著減少。本研究之結果有助於補充國內相關研究之缺口，並可供實務界參考之用。

關鍵字

限制員工權利新股；監察人；審計委員會；薪酬委員會；實質盈餘管理；應計盈餘管理

並列摘要

This research investigates the impact that issuance of restricted stock grants has on real earnings management in publicly-traded companies in Taiwan. I also discuss whether the improvements in supervision under overlapping supervisors/audit committees and remuneration committees have negative impacts on the aforementioned relationship. Finally, I investigate the substitution of real earnings management for accruals management. Using the convergence of interest hypothesis, as a foundation, our findings reveal that the fundamental remuneration strength of restricted stock grants is not positively associated with the extent to which real earnings management is pursued; however, a significant positive association with that the pursuance of accruals management was revealed. Ostensibly, the overlapping ratio of supervisors/audit committee and remuneration committee does not undermine the extent to which companies implement real earnings management or accruals management. Nevertheless, the higher the overlapping ratio and the stronger the fundamental remuneration of the restricted stock grants are, the less likely companies are to engage in both real earnings management and accruals management. This study provides results that serve to replenish the deficit in the existing literature and provides insights for practical use.