本研究探討揭露關鍵查核事項(KAM)是否影響投資人對會計師疏失程度與法律責任的判斷,以及KAM的內容(制式vs.客製)是否影響上述判斷,本研究採用3×1的參與者間設計,並徵募61名EMBA學生代表非專業投資人並參與實驗。本研究發現當查核後財務報表發布後發現存貨高估時,相較於查核報告「沒有揭露KAM」的參與者,「制式KAM」與「客製KAM」參與者所判斷的會計師疏失程度與法律責任均較低。但本研究並未發現「制式KAM」與「客製KAM」的參與者,其所判斷的疏失程度與法律責任有所差異。中介分析顯示,揭露KAM降低參與者對會計師的負面感覺,進而降低他們所判斷的疏失程度與法律責任。
This study examines whether the disclosure of key audit matters (KAM) affects investor's judgments about auditors' negligence and legal liability, and whether KAM content (boilerplate vs. tailor-made) affects these judgments. We adopted a 3x1 between-participants design, and recruited 61 EMBA students to represent unprofessional investors and participate in the experiment. Compared to participants in the "no KAM disclosure" condition, participants in both boilerplate KAM and tailor-made KAM conditions perceived a lower degree of auditor negligence and legal liability when the amount of inventory was overstated subsequent to the issuance of audited financial statements. However, there was no significant difference in the judgments between participants in the boilerplate condition and in the tailor-made condition. Mediation analysis shows that the disclosure of KAM reduces negative affect of auditors, which in turn lowers judgments of auditor negligence and legal liability.