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The Optimal Luxury Tax Policy and Its Exit Mechanism

最佳奢侈稅政策與其退出機制

摘要


After experiencing the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, most governments have tended to cut their budgets. Although imposing a tax on luxury goods is a good way to increase government revenue, it also induces negative consumption externalities and thereby leads to a possible distortion in economic behavior. In addition to a theoretical demonstration of the negative influence of a luxury tax on economic growth and the capital stock, this paper, more importantly, theoretically deduces the timing for starting the exit mechanism of the luxury tax, which is related to several economic conditions. In addition, we simulate the optimal luxury tax for Taiwan. Our results should serve as valuable reference to policy-makers.

並列摘要


在歷經全球金融風暴及歐債危機後,多數政府採取了撙節預算的方針來因應。儘管課徵奢侈稅是增加政府稅收的另一好方案,但該政策卻也可能衍生負面的消費外部性及扭曲的經濟行為。除對奢侈稅負向的影響經濟成長及資本存量之理論推論外,本研究亦推導出奢侈稅之退場機制的最佳啟動時間點。另外,本研究亦提供台灣之理論奢侈稅率之模擬。相信本文研究能提供政府奢侈稅方面的政策參考。

參考文獻


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