“人類尊嚴”法學思維初探－從人類體外胚胎談人性尊嚴之另一面向

A Preliminary Overview on Mankind Dignity-Another Aspect of Human Dignity with Special Reference to In-Vitro Embryos

邱玟惠(Wen-Hui Chiu)

《臺北大學法學論叢》 69期 (2009/03) Pp. 39-85

https://doi.org/10.6774/TULR.200903.0039

摘要

現代生殖科技顛覆了人類胚胎須於母體內發生之鐵則，而體外胚胎所引發之憲法議題，正提供吾人對生命權與人性尊嚴之意涵作深刻省思之契機。
針對人類體外胚胎之憲法保障，素有生命權與人性尊嚴二說。本文認爲生命權保障說終究不可採；至於人性尊嚴保障說，倘吾人能不侷限於個人主體性之人性尊嚴思考，辨明人性尊嚴除了憲法第8至22條宣示以個人爲權利主體性之理解外，尚另有基於尊重人類異於其他物種之另一面向理解－「人類尊嚴」，即可透過憲法第23條「公共利益」之比例原則審查，妥善解決體外胚胎與他人基本權（譬如，學術研究自由權）間之衝突。果爾，此「人類尊嚴」面向之人性尊嚴，即不失其爲妥善保護體外胚胎之憲法機制。
「人類尊嚴」之法學思維，其實早已存在於法哲學理論與憲法詮釋實務中，只是與個人主體性之人性尊嚴常同步地受到尊重，故多隱而未顯，未被特別強調而已。然而，將人性尊嚴區分爲此二面向之理解，具有法學論理上之實益，特別是在權利主體性不明確之情形下（譬如，體外胚胎、離體培養之各式人體器官組織之衍生物等），藉由此重疊二面向之保障機制，應更可穩健地周全生物科技時代下人性尊嚴之意涵。

關鍵字

胚胎 ； 體外胚胎 ； 胚胎保護 ； 生命權 ； 人性尊嚴 ； 個人尊嚴 ； 人類尊嚴 ； 憲法保障 ； 權利主體

並列摘要

Reproductive biotechnology nowadays has made it possible for the first time ever in the million-year history of human beings, the iv-vitro embryo to develop outside the maternal genital organs. The in-vitro embryo herein and the coming human-animal hybrid embryos will certainly evoke controversial and complex legal issues, which were totally far away from the contemporary scope of Constitution Drafters' imagination, and are the difficult tasks facing us from the very moment on to answer ”What is life?” and ”What is human dignity?”
To preserve life and to respect human dignity is the core value of the constitutional structure of free democracy, yet which and to what extent should be applied to the protection on in-vitro embryo remained world widely disputed though already well elaborated in piles. This article holds that the beginning of human life could only be legally demarcated if not betrayed to biological facts and social general concepts, and accordingly exempts the in-vitro embryos. On the other hand, this article tries to elucidate furthermore the essence of human dignity, to which the individual-centered personal dignity and the species-centered mankind dignity are subordinated. The mankind dignity herein characterized itself as the core value of what human beings differ from nonhuman ones in the special ”ends-in-themselves” status, i.e. they cannot be used as a mere means to another's ends.
This proposed concept of mankind dignity could certainly be applied to all human-related biological parts (living persons as a whole, cadavers, organs, tissues, cells, sperms, oocytes, and embryos in-vivo or in-vitro), theoretically dodge the traditional disputes and controversies, successfully help to establish and preserve the core value of the constitutional structure regarding protection on the in-vitro embryos.

並列關鍵字

Embryo ； In-vitro Embryo ； Protection for Embryo ； Rights for Life ； Human Dignity ； Personal Dignity ； Mankind Dignity ； Constitutional Guarantee ； Subjects of Rights

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