本文探討法域競爭下的法律市場力量係如何運作,從而形塑各法域的管制內涵。本文將先探討法律市場的相關基礎理論,而提出一實是性假設:法域競爭中之法律市場力量會對於一法域不尊重商業需求以及制定無效率或過度管制等行爲加以抑制。其後,本文分別進行三項個案研究,探討19世紀美國及當代歐洲各自發生時間相差近100年的公司設立登記地競爭,以及美國2002年之沙賓法對外國發行人的負面影響等議題,以進一步印證前開假設。具體言之,在法律市場之需求面,一法域之過度管制及不尊重商業需求之舉動,創造公司外移之誘因。接著,在法律市場之供給面,外移行爲引起法域內仰賴外移公司之當地利益團體爲自己及外移公司之利益來訴求法律管制彈性。最後,在外移權與訴求權之壓力下,該法域政府即從善如流地鬆綁過度管制措施。再者,透過此等個案研究,某程度即足以了解法域競爭之運作內涵。表面上看起來,由於美國與歐洲的公司法律市場係發生於聯邦或類似聯邦之體制下,而前開沙賓法之事例則發生於國際場合,故或以爲前開公司法律市場與全球跨國上市法律市場可能相去甚遠,無法互相比擬。然而,實質面以觀,此等個案均清楚地說明,存在於美國聯邦體制或歐盟類似聯邦體制下之法域競爭中的法律市場力量,亦會在國際法域競爭中發揮作用。
This article seeks to explore how law market forces underlying jurisdictional competition operate, thus shaping regulation by jurisdictions. Inspired from basic theories involving the law market, this article would first propose a positive hypothesis that law market forces underlying jurisdictional competition would constrain jurisdictions from disregarding business demands and from imposing inefficient or excessive regulation. To substantiate the above hypothesis, I will conduct the following three case studies: corporate charter competitions in the 19-century U.S. and contemporary Europe as well as the negative impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (”SOX”) on foreign issuers. Specifically, on the demand side of the law market, excessive regulation and disregard of business demands create an incentive to leave. And then exit, on the supply side, activates local industries that depend on the exiting firms to voice their petition for legal flexibility. This, in turn, pressures politicians to liberalize excessive regulations. Moreover, through these case studies, we can, to an extent, realize how jurisdictional competition is at work. The law market for cross-listings following the enactment of SOX seems far removed from the two corporate law markets mentioned above because the former operates on the national level rather than within federal systems of the United States or Europe. Nonetheless, these cases clearly tell with one accord that law market forces similar to those operating under jurisdictional competition within federal systems are also at work in an international context.