股東會投票顧問機構之運作與規範

The Operation and Regulation of Proxy Advisor

黃朝琮(Chao-Tsung Huang)

《臺北大學法學論叢》 118期 (2021/06) Pp. 177-263

摘要

在公開發行公司股權近年來集中於機構投資人的趨勢下，投票顧問機構於公司治理開始扮演舉足輕重角色，其投票建議得以影響相當比例股權之投票意向。然投票顧問機構之運作亦非毫無爭議，就美國而言，論者不乏有因投票顧問機構人力配置、投票建議作成程序不透明、投票顧問服務市場過度集中、機構投資人盲從投票建議投票及利益衝突等疑慮，對投票顧問機構之服務品質有所質疑。對此，美國證管會在經過十年研討後，於2020年藉由修改Regulation 14A之方式，就投票顧問機構之運作，有所規範。我國金管會於2020年發布之公司治理藍圖3.0中，亦參考國際趨勢，指出將擴大盡職治理產業鏈，而規劃建立國際投票顧問機構與上市櫃公司議合機制，並參考國際規範研議訂定投票顧問機構之盡職治理守則。本文介紹、探討美國關於投票顧問機構之實務運作及學說實務見解，以及2020年修正之Regulation 14A條文，而在此基礎上，就公司治理藍圖3.0之規劃進行觀察，並加以檢討。

關鍵字

投票顧問機構 ； 機構投資人 ； 盡職治理守則 ； 公司治理藍圖3.0 ； 盲從投票 ； 委託書 ； 證券投資顧問

並列摘要

With the concentration of shares into institutional investors, proxy advisors start to play a significant role in corporate governance, providing voting recommendations that would sway voting decisions by shareholders with significant shareholding. However, the operation of proxy advisors is arguably controversial. In the US, commentators concern that the quality of proxy advisors' voting recommendations would be affected by lack of manpower, untransparent process to forge voting recommendations, concentration of the proxy advisory market, robot-voting and conflict of interest. To response, the US SEC amends Regulation 14A in 2020 to regulate proxy advisors. In Taiwan, the Financial Supervisory Commission adopts the Roadmap of Corporate Governance 3.0, which plans to expand the stewardship business and establish the communication mechanism between proxy advisors and listing companies. This article explores the operation and comments on proxy advisors in the US and the amendment of Regulation 14A in 2020. Based on such exploration, this article further comments on the relevant planning stipulated in the Roadmap of Corporate Governance 3.0.

並列關鍵字

Proxy Advisor ； Institutional Investor ； Stewardship Code ； Roadmap of Corporate Governance 3.0 ； Robo-voting ； Proxy ； Securities Investment Advisor

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