Outsourcing and Technology Spillovers with Delegation

管理授權下的外包與技術外溢

李丹丹 ； 夏立國 ； 張莉 ； 黃恆中

《亞太經濟管理評論》 9卷2期 (2006/03) Pp. 75-80

https://doi.org/10.30087/APEMR.200603.0005

摘要

先進經濟體系中之廠商尋求國際化外包時，理由之一是發展落後國家的低成本。當廠商外包其產品生產時，它必須在成本節省之邊際利益與透過技術外溢而降低競爭對手之邊際成本取得平衡，但對於沒有取得外包契約之廠商而言，則可透過提供給負責生產管理者的誘因設計，在產品市場進行競爭。
本文結論：未取得外包契約之競爭對手，將透過管理授權來選擇更有企圖心的管理者以進行市場競爭。此一來，採取管理授權策略將會導致未取得外包契約廠商之勞動雇用增加外，授權公司其本國就業水準也為之增加，但取得外包契約廠商之勞動雇用卻為之減少。

關鍵字

外包 ； 技術外溢 ； 管理授權

並列摘要

One of the reasons for international outsourcing by firms located in advanced economies is that labor is cheaper in less developed countries. When firm outsources its production, it must balance the marginal gain (cost saving) of outsourcing with the marginal cost of doing so (lowering rivals' cost). But for firm who didn't receive outsourcing contract will provide incentive scheme to its manager who is responsible for production decision in order to compete in the product market.
This paper reaches the following conclusion: in order to compete with the outsourcing firm, the rival firm will take delegation and choose a more aggressive manager to compete. Managerial strategic-adoption will result in an increase in the employment level of firm 2, an increase in the home employment level of firm 1, and a fall in the outsourcing of firm 1.

並列關鍵字

Outsourcing ； Technology Spillover ； Delegation

參考文獻

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