- 期刊
混合寡占下工會議價與民營化
Union-wage Bargaining and Privatization in Mixed Duopoly
摘要
本文探討當工資決定於企業與工會之間的議價均衡時，則公營企業民營化之路將何去何從的問題。文中分別依分權議價與集權議價兩種類型共設定兩個三階段動態賽局模型，在第一階段政府宣告釋股比例，第二階段企業與工會進行議價，第三階段雙占廠商同時進行產量競爭。根據模型推演與模擬結果發現，當公營事業民營化之後若不受額外之行政干預，且政府民營化目的最終是要使公營事業走向企業化，則完全民營化並不是最佳的。其次，兩團體間存在議價行為時，若公營事業民營化，不論是企業工會或產業聯合工會，當工會議價能力在民營化前具有相對強勢地位，若在民營化後相對轉弱，此時社會福利反而有提升的可能性。
並列摘要
This paper examines the issues regarding the optimal initial public offerings (IPOs) strategy of public enterprises while wage rates are determined by union bargaining in a mixed duopoly. Two different types of union-wage bargaining are assumed, decentralized bargaining and centralized bargaining. A three stage dynamic game is built upon for each type of bargaining. At the initial stage, the government announces the IPO strategy. At the second stage, firm-union wage bargaining is carried out. At the third stage, two firms conduct in Cournot competition. Numeric analyses are followed after theoretical reasoning. It is argued that full privatization is not optimal even if the target of privatization is profit maximization. The effect of privatization on social welfare is discussed. It is shown that whether social welfare may be improved after privatization is reliant on the relative bargaining strength between firms and labor union.