Strategic Delegation in Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs

策略性授權過去大多僅受限於在銷售額的應用，直到Jansen et al. (2007)及 Ritz (2008)才發表市場份額授權的分析。本文採用了一個更加簡化的市場份額參數，藉以探討廠商之間存在成本不對稱下的授權議題。研究結果指出，產出決策以及誘因契約將會受到市場規模以及成本差異效果所影響。本研究模型引入的授權型式，仍然保留了Jansen et al.及 Ritz 二文中均衡的重要特性。此外，相較於銷售額授權而言，市場份額授權的產量競爭程度較不強烈，也因此其利潤會較高。

關鍵字

市場份額授權；銷售額授權；不對稱成本

並列摘要

Strategic delegation analysis was limited to sales delegation cases, until Jansen et al. (2007) and Ritz (2008) presented the case of market share delegation. In this paper, we adopt a simplified version of the market share parameter to deal with the cost asymmetry between firms. It shows that both output decision and incentive contract are affected by market size and cost difference. In addition, the new form of market share delegation not only preserves the spirit of Jansen et al. and Ritz, but also becomes useful in dealing with most multi-stage games of concerned issues as well. Furthermore, for the cost-efficient firm, the not-so-competitive action makes the profit of the market-share delegation firm more than that of the sales delegation firm.

並列關鍵字

Market Share Delegation ； Sales Delegation ； Asymmetric Costs

參考文獻

Fershtman, C.,Judd, K.(1987).Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly.American Economic Review.77,927-940.

Google Scholar

Jansen, T.,Van Lier, A.,Van Witteloostuijn, A.(2007).A Note on Strategic Delegation: the Market Share Case.International Journal of Industrial Organization.25,531-539.