原因與理由：霍布斯公民哲學的二元體系

有關霍布斯《利維坦》的研究，長期以來一直被某種唯物主義的閱讀方式所主導，但其結果，卻是忽略了霍布斯藉此經典所要傳達的道德與政治意涵。本文試圖探索這些缺漏，並提出一個不同的詮釋架構，來說明同時存在霍布斯著作中的兩個重要觀念，亦即原因與理由。追隨歐克秀的觀點，作者認為，《利維坦》是一部藝術作品、一個迷思，但非科學；霍布斯實際上是一位帶著幽暗之懷疑論信條的懷疑論者；也因此，霍布斯從來沒有混淆基於科學推理的理性行為與源於自願活動的道德行為之間的差異。為了更清楚地表明：霍布斯是一位藉著意志賦予義務以新的基礎的道德哲學家，而非透過因果法則來研究經驗世界的政治科學家，作者將引入學界晚近的研究成果，嘗試把霍布斯放在所謂的「皮婁主義危機」之中，來做重新解讀。通過以上的重建，作者同時希望能從不同的論述平台，來反思邊沁所謂的「霍布斯悖論」：霍布斯究竟是一位「原初的自由主義者」，還是一位「絕對的專制主義者」。

關鍵字

霍布斯；利維坦；歐克秀；懷疑主義；唯物主義；公民結社；自由主義

並列摘要

The study of Hobbes's Leviathan has long been dominated by a materialistic reading, which deeply ignores the moral and political implications of the masterpiece that its author intended to deliver. The article explores these lacunae, seeking an alternative interpretation for grasping the ideas of cause and reason which seem to have coexisted in Hobbes's writings. It is my view, following Oakeshott, that Leviathan is a ”work of art”, a ”myth”, not science, that Hobbes was a ferocious sceptic with a ”darkly sceptical doctrine”, and consequently that Hobbes never confused the rational conduct based on scientific reasoning with the moral conduct arising from the activity of willing. In order to make the case that Hobbes is better understood as a moral philosopher, establishing a new foundation of obligation in terms of volition, rather than a political scientist, explaining the empirical world according to causality, I will try to re-place Hobbes into the very context of crise Pyrrhonienne. All this, I hope, may help us arrive at a different point to reconsider the ”paradoxes of Hobbes”, to use Bentham's famous phrase, namely, whether Hobbes is a proto-liberal or an absolutist.