臺灣國會制度中的遊說操控－地方制度法第四條「準用直轄市」修正案歷程剖析

Heresthetics in Legislative Yuan of Taiwan: The Analysis of Amendments to the Article 4 ＂mutatis mutandis＂ of the Local Government Act

詹立煒(Li-Wei Chan)

《臺灣民主季刊》 12卷1期 (2015/03) Pp. 55-114

摘要

因為政治參與者都有想贏的動機，所以W. Riker認為參與者利用集體決策的博弈過程，採取「遊說操控」以獲得想要的結果。本研究假定歷經三屆委員提案的地制法第四條準用案，能夠在第六屆立法院三讀通過，係因參與者運用上述策略而成功。對此，本文將地制法第四條準用案能否通過界定為結果變項，遊說操控的三項要素為因果變項，時序政治事件和既有制度為強化因果關係的前例變項。同時透過個案研究因果程序追蹤的方式，以第四、五、六屆立委的16項提案為分析單位，梳理修正過程的敘事脈絡，以敘述統計歸納提案類別，藉由政策空間模型解析參與者的策略互動。並針對三項問題進行推論分析：委員會召委對本案具有何種影響？提案委員是否採取策略投票？朝野如何進行議題面向操縱以改變集體決策結果？研究發現，委員會召委對於議題支配具有明顯影響力，並反映在議程、審查和協商的過程之中。其次，提案委員考量選區和可行性高低而採取策略投票並組建最小勝利聯盟。第三，黨團協商提供議題面向操縱的機會，使有意發動的參與者能夠以否決者之角色和利用獲利轉換的方式以影響院會決策。綜上，透過上述方法分析所得的結果，呈現出本文具有靜態法制分析與動態決策研究之特性。

關鍵字

地制法第四條 ； 遊說操控 ； 分析敘事 ； 政策空間模型 ； 因果過程追蹤

並列摘要

Politicians have desire and tendency to win, thus William H. Riker concludes that players are inclined to choose fields that able to be manipulated in political games in order to influence the outcome of collective choice. William H. Riker calls it ＂heresthetic.＂ In this article, we presume that the amendment of Local Government Act Article 4 to be the result of heresthetics among legislators. The outcome of the amendment is outcome variable. Agenda control, strategic voting and manipulation of dimensions are causal variables. Political events and existing institutions are antecedent variables. Therefore, we conforming characteristics of both static analysis of comparative law and dynamic analysis of decision-making and follow the concept of Empirical Implications for Theoretical Models, or EITM, to employ comparative case study of analytic narratives as our research method to study the following three issues: 1) The effect by the committee's conveners to these amendments, 2) Possibility that legislators who propose bills select ＂strategic voting,＂ 3) How do the party caucuses to manipulate the issue dimensions to change the outcome of group decision-making? The result in this article shows: first, the committee's conveners have obvious effects on ＂agenda control,＂ and it reflects on agenda processing, deliberation and consultations. Second, the legislators who propose bills will consider the political feasibility to adopt the strategic voting and build a minimal winning coalition. Third, there are two functions in Party Caucuses Negotiations, one is the ＂side payments;＂ the other is ＂veto player＂. Parties in Legislative Yuan will use these functions to manipulate the outcomes in Yuan Sittings.

並列關鍵字

article 4 of the LGA ； heresthetics ； analytic narratives ； policy spatial model ； causal process tracing

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