新型冠狀肺炎的傳播為各國法律制度帶來巨幅之衝擊與挑戰。因其傳播速度的迅猛與高致命性使得此一公共衛生威脅兼具緊急狀態的色彩,從而有從例外狀態的國家緊急應變權加以闡釋的必要性。2020年疫情爆發之初,各國的法律制度第一時間均直面是否啟動緊急狀態的試煉。本文首先探討美國與我國緊急狀態法制的理論淵源、建構歷程與個案實踐。續以美國與我國緊急法制回應疫情的預防性措施作為個案研究標的,探求美國與我國關於應急法制之整備,於遭遇公共衛生緊急狀態之國家明顯重大威脅時,能否兼顧抗疫需求並維繫憲政原理於不墜。本文發現採行聯邦制之美國在防疫層級治理上,聯邦與各州的應急安全網之法制雖較我國完備,惟肇因於川普政權於發動美國聯邦憲法所賦予之緊急命令權的時點延宕,且疏於行使憲法之列舉式緊急命令權,導致與其他層級的行動整合上產生令出多門的政策搖擺,欠缺集中且由上而下的領導統御以致防疫治理的失控與失靈。復次,兩國的個案研究發現,以國會緊急立法為主軸取代憲法緊急命令權乃兩國因應COVID-19的共通點,此等由災害應變法律與公共衛生應急法制疊合交錯的法律洪流,似凸顯憲法賦予之總統緊急權限的弱化和空洞化,隨之對人權保障和加以把關的司法控制帶來深層嚴峻的挑戰。
The spread of COVID-19 brings holistic and tough impacts to legal institutions. As the Roman proverb goes, necessity knows no law. This public health hazard has quickly developed into a state of emergency and an exception which must be admitted when discussing legal order, due to the disease's strikingly rapid transmission and high fatality rate. To handle the lingering state of emergency caused by the pandemic in 2020, many states have either set up or altered their legal and procedural supervision mechanisms. This paper firstly examines the theoretical origins, developments, transformations and practices of the legal infrastructures with regard to state of emergency in the US and Taiwan. Based on such background, we further analyze the emergent preventive measures for COVID-19 in the two states, testing if their emergency legal systems are able to curb the pandemic while abiding by their constitutional principles. Our research shows that compared with Taiwan's disease control model, the US federalism equips the federal and state governments with better legal frameworks to establish emergency safety nets. Despite this, the Trump administration failed to timely invoke the constitution-assigned presidential emergency order, engendering policy swings and incoordination between the federal and state authorities. The lack of coherence in the US leadership eventually led to the failure of the country's pandemic governance. On the other hand, our comparative study indicates that in both nations' approaches to inhibit COVID-19, the Presidential emergency power (decree) embedded in the Constitutions is replaced by the emergency legislation. The lawmaking-dependent inclination marked by the integration of laws for managing disasters and threats to public health not only highlights the decline of presidential emergency powers granted by constitutional laws, but also brings profound challenges to judicial review which aims to ensure human rights.