假訊息管制的言論自由理論思考：美國法的比較觀察

當政府考量是否以擴大或加重既有追究個人散布假訊息之法律責任，防治假訊息之危害時，應審慎評估此舉與憲法言論自由保護間衝突關係的處理。本文藉由United States v. Alvarez案說明美國法院處理言論自由保護方法取向之差異，並說明言論人是否知悉言論內容為假，會影響言論價值之判斷，但言論人之言論目的則不應具影響言論價值之效果。針對政府限制不實言論之行為，由於涉及言論內容限制，美國法院多半採取嚴格審查標準檢驗該行為之合憲性，也因此大多做成違憲認定結果。然而，主要的言論自由理論，不論是思想市場說、民主自我統治說，或表現自我說，卻可能導向不支持讓不實言論免於政府審查的結果。理論與實務落差之關鍵在於：政府角色的不被信任；即便道理上應區分言論內容的真、假，但一旦將此辨別「真／假」的工作，託付予政府，對於言論自由造成的傷害風險，極有可能大於容許政府篩選真、假言論可能帶來的利益。也因此，倘若選擇以立法方式管制虛假言論，就必須嚴格控管此立法行為未違憲侵害言論自由保護。

關鍵字

假訊息；假新聞；言論自由；言論內容限制；類型化方法；美國訴阿爾瓦雷斯案

並列摘要

Whenever the government contemplates to impose more stringent liability on individuals who spread disinformation, the purpose of combating disinformation shall be properly balanced with the potential conflict with the freedom of speech. This article introduces United States v. Alvarez in illustrating the approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding free speech matters. Among others, the main observation is that whether the person who made the speech is aware of the genuineness of the speech is one of the key factors when the Court decides the value of the speech made; as to the purpose of the speech, it shall not affect the value of the speech. Since the government's action in restricting disinformation relates to content-based restrictions, the U.S. Court mainly adopts the strict scrutiny test in reviewing the constitutionality of said action and most actions have been determined to be unconstitutional. However, if other major theories of the freedom of speech were adopted in reviewing the government actions, such as the marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance, or individual liberty and autonomy, it is likely to lead to a different conclusion that disinformation shall be exempted from government scrutiny. The gap between academic theories and court practices is that people do not trust the government. Even if it could not be more true that genuine information shall be treated differently from fake ones; however, if the role of determining whether the speech is true or false falls under the government's discretion, the risk of harms to free speech can be significantly higher than the benefit brought by allowing the government to screen out disinformation. Accordingly, if laws are the tools in regulating disinformation, it is vital to ensure that such laws will not infringe the freedom of speech.