- 期刊
China's Military Threat Poses a Clear and Present Danger to Taiwan and East Asia
並列摘要
Between July, 1995 and March, 1996 the armed forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), conducted a series of large scale military exercises in and near the Taiwan Strait. These exercises included combined air and naval live-fire exercises using various advanced air-to-air, ship-to-ship, and ship-to-air missiles; amphibious landings with naval and air force fire support; and deployment of Special Forces. Perhaps the most notable event of these exercises was the test firing of China's DF-15 short range ballistic missile (SRBM) better known as the M-9. These missiles were targeted close to the northern Taiwan port of Keelung and the southern port of Kaohsiung during the period of March 8-13, 1996. The PRC's deliberate military escalation was meant to influence perceived (or misperceived) independence activities in Taiwan at a time when the people were exercising democracy in the first direct election of their president. China's military coercion triggered an immediate response from the U.S. Washington sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to areas close to Taiwan as symbols of U.S. determination to protect its interests in the Western Pacific Ocean. U.S. military intervention in March, 1996, effectively eased tension in the Taiwan Strait and sent a strong message to Beijing that it will not allow Beijing to unilaterally impose military threats to compromise peace and stability in the Strait. However, Beijing apparently was not and is not intimidated by U.S. deterrents. Instead, Beijing has relentlessly increased its military modernization with specific focus on winning a, so-called, ”local high-tech war” against future Taiwan de jure independence. This article attempts to assess the intent and capability of Beijing to continue to bring increasing pressure on Taiwan and escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait as demonstrated by its incessant military build-up during the period 1996-2005.