多因素激勵機制下非對稱保險仲介市場均衡分析

The Analysis of Competition Equilibrium in the Insurance Intermediary Market with Asymmetrical Information under Multi-factors Incentive Mechanism

陳鵬(Peng Chen) ； 金芳(Fang Jin) ； 郎國放(Guo-Fang Lang)

《管理科學與統計決策》 3卷4期 (2006/12) Pp. 58-65

https://doi.org/10.6704/JMSSD.2006.3.4.58

摘要

保險仲介市場是典型的資訊不對稱市場。當參與人之間存在資訊不對稱時，市場價格機制往往失靈。此時，像保險人對保險仲介入進行激勵這種非價格制度安排，對保險仲介市場達到均衡則更為有效。對這類問題的研究，目前主要包括顯性激勵和隱性激勵、單因素激勵和多因素激勵幾種方式。本文將運用委託－代理理論，就非對稱資訊條件下的多因素最優激勵合同進行探討，從而得到保險仲介市場達到競爭均衡的條件及市場主體的均衡策略。

關鍵字

非對稱資訊 ； 保險仲介入 ； 均衡分析 ； 多因素激勵機制

並列摘要

The insurance intermediary market is a typical market with asymmetrical information. In this case price mechanism maybe failed. The non-price institutional arrangements such as incentive contracts provide a more effective style to the equilibrium of a competed insurance intermediary market. At present the studies of how insurer exerts incentive to insurance agent mainly include the analysis of explicit and implicit Incentives, single factor and multi-factors incentives mechanism. In view of the credit standing as an important lucrative factor to insurance agent, it is evident that the analysis of multi-factors incentive mechanism has much academic and realistic significance. Based on the principal-agent theory we discuss the double factors incentive mechanism under asymmetric information, we can receive the condition forming equilibrium of a competed insurance intermediary market and the equilibrium strategies of partner.

並列關鍵字

asymmetric information ； insurance intermediary market ； equilibrium analysis ； multi-factors incentive mechanism

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