A Reexamination of the Signaling through IPOs Underpricing

Cheng-Shou Lu

《管理科學與統計決策》 7卷3期 (2010/09) Pp. 89-98

https://doi.org/10.6704/JMSSD.2010.7.3.89

並列摘要

The empirical evidence supports the signaling theory is still controversial and shows that a pooling equilibrium exists as the low-quality IPOs imitate the pricing strategy of the high-quality ones. The major assumption is that the market will impose a penalty on the issuers who do not signal their true type. This result shows that the type of market equilibrium is related to the existence of the penalty cost. With a costly mechanism, the model demonstrates that a separating equilibrium exists. That is, the offering price of the high-quality IPOs will be lower than that of the low-quality IPOs. Without a costly mechanism, a pooling equilibrium exists as both types of issuers sell shares at the same offering price.

並列關鍵字

Initial public offerings ； Underpricing ； Signaling

參考文獻

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