透過您的圖書館登入
IP:18.218.213.153
  • 期刊

公司治理是否降低權益成本?

Would Corporate Governance Reduce the Cost of Equity Capital?

摘要


本研究主要探討台灣上市(櫃)公司股權結構,董事會監督機制是否會降低權益資金成本?本文將代理問題區分為核心代理問題和權益代理問題,探討公司治理對權益資金成本之影響。實證結果表示:(1)管理者持股與權益資金成本呈負相關。(2)控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大,權益資金成本愈大,顯示核心代理問題會使投資人要求較高之風險溢酬。(3)(4)權益資金成本會隨董監持股比率、外部董監事比率及機構投資人持股比率而減少,但會因董監事股權質押及董事長兼任總經理而增加。(5)核心代理問題和權益代理問題具有抵換關係。

並列摘要


The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on cost of equity capital. The main feature of this study is that we divide the agency problem into core agency problem and equity agency problem, and we explore the relation between corporate governance and cost of equity capital. Overall, this paper expects to explain corporate governance and can reduce agency problem and the efficient corporate governance can decrease cost of equity capital. The empirical results indicate as follows: First, managerial ownership is negatively related to cost of equity capital and hence supports convergence-of-interest hypothesis. Second, as controlling right deviates from cash flow right, cost of equity capital is getting worse, that is, core agency problems become more serious in the firm. Third, the shares of board directors, institutional ownership and the number of the outside directors have negative relationship with cost of equity capital, but the pledged share ratio of directors and the chief executive officer (CEO) duality have positive relationship with cost of equity capital. Finally, Trade-off Relationship between core agency problem and equity agency problem.

參考文獻


王元章、張椿柏(2011)。從核心代理問題的角度探討股權結構,董事會特性對公司價值之影響。證券市場發展季刊。23(2),131-174。
王元章、張椿柏(2012)。核心代理問題對盈餘管理之影響。會計審計論叢。2(2),69-113。
李春安、吳欽杉、葉麗玉(2003)。所有權結構與公司非法行為關係之研究─以台灣股票上市公司為例。證券市場發展季刊。14(4),75-138。
周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏(1996)。家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究。中國財務學刊。4(1),115-139。
林松樹(2002)。公司治理與獨立董監事。鼎信會計師事務所。

被引用紀錄


何宸緯(2017)。董監事責任險與權益資金成本關係之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺中科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0061-0306201717212300

延伸閱讀