A Game-Theory Model of Democratization and Political Reform in Hong Kong

Mathew Y. H. Wong

《Taiwan Journal of Democracy》 12卷2期 (2016/12) Pp. 127-154

摘要

This essay analyzes three attempts at political reform in post-handover Hong Kong by adapting game-theory models in studies of democratization. By modeling the strategic interactions and preferences of Beijing and the local democratic forces, the outcome of the political reform efforts are explained. As a conditioning factor in the model, it is argued that the strong strength of civil society in 2005 and 2015 ruled out any possible negotiation between the Beijing and the democrats, resulting in deadlocks and the eventual rejection of the proposals. In contrast, the weaker and apolitical nature of civil society in 2010 allowed moderate democrats to reach an agreement with Beijing over a proposed reform. This essay carries significant implications for Hong Kong- Beijing interactions, the political development of Hong Kong, as well as the literature on democratization.

關鍵字

China ； democratization ； game theory ； Hong Kong ； transition

參考文獻

Przeworski, Adam(1991).Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.

Ma, Ngok(1997).The Sino-British Dispute over Hong Kong: A Game Theory Interpretation.Asian Survey.37(8),738-751.

Sing, Ming(2003).Governing Elites, External Events and Pro-Democratic Opposition in Hong Kong (1986-2002).Government and Opposition.38(4),456-478.

Cheng, Joseph(ed.)(2014).New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong.Hong Kong:City University of Hong Kong Press.

Huntington, Samuel P.(1991).The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.Norman:University of Oklahoma Press.