Sustaining Global Trade Liberalization: China's G8 Opportunity

持續進行中的全球貿易自由化：中國在G8的機會

柯爾頓(Professor John Kirton)

《Taiwanese Journal of WTO Studies》 11期 (2008/12) Pp. 1-61

https://doi.org/10.30392/TJWTOS.200812_(11).0001

摘要

2007年的八國高峰會議(Group of Eight, G8)在德國的海利根達姆(Heiligendamm)舉行。該次高峰會的重大成就之一就是G8與新興經濟體啟動了所謂「海利根達姆進程」(Heiligendamm Process)的對話機制。同時，八大工業國領袖也贏得新興經濟體及開發中國家的支持，達成共同奮鬥以適應氣候變遷的協議。參與對話機制的國家除G8成員外，尚包含巴西、中國、印度、墨西哥與南非等新興經濟體。對話機制強調創新、投資自由化、智慧財產(intellectual property)、發展以及能源效率議題。未來海利根達姆進程是否會導致英國首相布萊爾(Tony Blair)所預測的完全質變(complete metamorphosis)則是八國高峰會與新興經濟體政治領袖們的重大挑戰。但是朝此方向發展將有助於將貿易直接加入議程，終能實現布萊爾的預測。
有不少人指出目前八國高峰會之所以在全球貿易治理上失敗的原因。絕大多數將之歸咎於不斷變遷的專業能力，因為全球貿易的權力正越來越從G8的成員過渡到G8外的新興經濟國家。為此，G8已試圖引進新興的貿易強國。首先是在1999年透過20國集團(the Group of Twenty, G20)的財長對話來達成此目標，接著又自2004年起經由七國財長俱樂部來邀請中國財長與會，終而從2003年開始藉舉行G8加五的高峰會對話來改善與發展中國家的溝通管道。但是儘管G8允許其四邊對話對由新興經濟強國所組成的新G20貿易部長會議做出讓步，不過後者卻未能加速杜哈回合的議程(Doha Development Agenda, DDA)，也未能使之有圓滿的結局。
迄今，現存的一些有關「海利根達姆進程」的文獻對此進程的前景抱持謹慎的樂觀態度，而另一方面則點出該進程所面臨的許多障礙。但是卻無一文章論及「海利根達姆進程」對全球貿易治理的潛在貢獻，也沒有一篇文章從詳細的之前身、緣起、協商、架構與早期的運作情形為基礎來檢視該進程未來可能的成果。本文主旨即在從全球貿易治理貢獻的角度來深入分析「海利根達姆進程」過去的發展過程、現況與未來的發展潛力。

關鍵字

貿易自由化 ； 八國高峰會議 ； 加拿大 ； 中國

並列摘要

His first forecast proved to be a failure, for as 2007 ended, the badly overdue Doha Development Agenda (DDA) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) remained undone. But his second proved prescient, as the Group of Eight's (G8) June 6-8th, 2007 Summit launched a new Heiligendamm Process (HP) of structured dialogue between the G8 and ”outreach five” (O5) countries led by China on investment, intellectual property, development and energy. Whether the HP will lead to the complete metamorphosis called for by Blair is a key challenge for political leadership in both the G8 and O5 in the coming years. But as it moves in that direction, it could usefully add trade directly to its agenda and thus help make Blair's first prediction come true in the end.
This potential arises first from the G8's proven performance as a centre of global governance over its first thirty two years. Since its inception as the Group of Seven (G7) in 1975, this club of major market powers has made several decisive contributions to global governance in a growing array of fields. It has helped its members more effectively manage their domestic politics, deliberate about domestic and international problems, set new normative directions to address them, take collective decisions to solve them, implement those decisions and institutionalize them in G8-centred bodies of its own. At the same time, the G8 has faced a barrage of criticisms, ranging from its failure to involve its citizens, deal with the right issues, define proper directions, make appropriate decisions, comply with them completely, and involve the relevant powers, international organizations, civil society and other actors in the galaxy of global governance that the G8 has now become (Bayne 2001, 2004, 2005; Fratianni et al. 2007, Hajnal 2007a, 2007b; Putnam and Bayne 1987).
This record of achievement and disappointment has been evident in international trade. Since the start, the G8 has played a critical catalytic role in successfully launching and concluding successive rounds of multilateral trade liberalization. Yet it has been taking longer for an internally divided and seeming less influential G8 to launch and conclude successive rounds. And its latest launch-the innovative DDA initially destined to be done by 2004-is now badly overdue, with no end in sight.
There are many alleged causes of the G8's current failure in global trade governance. The most obvious flow from changing specialized capability, as global trade power increasingly shifts from those within the G8 to the major emerging powers outside. To be sure, the G8 has moved to incorporate the new trade powers, first through the Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers forum it launched in 1999, then through the G7 finance ministers club reaching out to China since 2004, and finally through the G8 Plus Five Summit dialogue beginning in 2003 and unfolding continuously since 2005. But the G8's newest full member, Russia, remains outside the WTO, while the WTO's newest major member, China, remains outside the G8. And while the G8 has allowed its own Quadrilateral to give way to a new G20 trade ministers' caucus created by the emerging powers, the latter has not brought Doha Development Agenda (DDA) to a speedy and successful end.
There is thus much riding on the outcome of the HP-the latest experiment in combined established-emerging power governance. Trade itself is not one of the designated four subjects for the HP's two year structured dialogue. But the important trade-related issues of investment, intellectual property, development and energy efficiency are. The first two are central to the WTO and its ”Singapore issues.” The third is the very focus of the DDA And the latter has clear implications for trade, especially with Japan and the United States reportedly working on an initiative to accelerate trade liberalization in energy-efficient products at the Japanese-hosted G8 summit to be held in Hokkaido on July 7-9, 2008.
Thus far, the few existing accounts of the HP have expressed cautious optimism about its prospects, while highlighting the many obstacles it confronts (Kirton 2007; Gnath 2007; Cooper and Jackson 2007). But none has dealt with its potential contribution to global trade governance. And none has examined in detail its precursors, origins, negotiation, architecture and early operation as a basis for judging how successful it could be, both in the trade domain and overall.
This study presents the first detailed analysis of the past, present and potential of the new Heiligendamm Process as a contributor to global governance in trade, in the many other issues where the fates of the G8 and emerging powers are increasingly intertwined, and as a more effective and legitimate centre of global governance at large. It first examines the G8's record in general and in trade in particular, the G8's treatment of China as the leading emerging power, the performance of the G20 and G7 finance ministers' forums in bringing the established and emerging powers together, and the G8 Plus Five process that began at the G8 summit in 2003. It then analyses the conception, negotiation, emergence and early operation of the HP created at the G8 summit in 2007. It concludes by identifying the HP's strengths and weaknesses, its potential to become a leaders-level club, and to contribute decisively to global governance in the field of trade.
This study argues that the prospects for the HP's emergence as an effective centre of trade and global governance are more promising than the existing analyses and current mood suggest. Both the G8 summit and trade G20 acting separately have failed to bring the DDA to a successful end. At the same time, there has been a transformation in the G8's treatment of China, and the two have now joined as equals to produce the balanced, broadening dialogue and results of the finance G20. The successes and shortcomings of the G8 Plus Five process have generated moves toward more institutionalized engagement between the G8 and emerging powers. Despite reservations among the G8’s most powerful members, the U.S. and Japan, and the concerns of many O5 about their unequal treatment, the maximum version of the HP has emerged, complete with a secretariat housed in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to foster its extensive work program over the next two years. Its future is promising, as a once resistant Japan has now accepted it, and a more enthusiastic Italy and Canada take over as G8 hosts in 2009 and 2010. The many growing vulnerabilities afflicting China, its O5 partners and the G8 members will make all more eager for common solutions, arrived at in common, to be found in the years ahead. Trade is the obvious place for this expanded contribution to global governance to start.

並列關鍵字

G8 ； trade liberalization ； Canada ； China

參考文獻

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