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摘要


The competitive edge of many companies and public trust in government institutions can often depend on the security of the information held in their systems. Breaches of that security, whether deliberate or accidental, can be profoundly damaging. Therefore, security is a highly topical issue for both designers and users of computer systems. A system is said to be secure if it supports the policy of a security model in a demonstrable way. Two users, or processes operating on their behalf, are communicating indirectly or covertly in such a system if they are communicating through means that violate the interpretation of the supported security model. Research to eliminate or resolve covert communication channels is limited compared to the real, rapid, and often dangerous threats these channels continuously pose. That is due; at large; to their ingenious, inventive, and numerous scenarios. In order for any two users to establish a covert channel, they both must know one another's identity. This paper proposes a design that is based on the fact that it is impossible inside a system for any process to recognize any user, for whom other processes are invoked, in order to covertly communicate with him or her - identities of all users are hidden. Our design is sought to eliminate covert channels that are known to a system and those that are unknown and waiting to be discovered and potentially utilized illicitly. The design is sought to eliminate covert channels indifferent to the scenario they employ.

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