再探討反傾銷政策之福利效果－加入廠商的規避行為後

有關反傾銷措施福利效果的研究大多假設廠商以降低傾銷差額的方式消極因應，本文進一步探討廠商的積極規避行為對反傾銷措施福利效果的影響。結果指出廠商選擇積極規避或消極因應的關鍵在於積極規避所需付出的成本大小，且當市場規模愈大或對未來利潤愈重視，在同樣的規避成本下，出口廠商積極規避的可能性愈高。而當均衡由消極因應轉變為積極規避時，反傾銷措施對進口國的福利改善效果將轉弱；對出口國而言，若甚為重視第二期，則其福利惡化的幅度縮小。因此，市場規模大的國家在執行反傾銷措施時尤須謹慎。

關鍵字

反傾銷；福利分析；貿易政策

並列摘要

Most of the studies on the welfare effects of antidumping policies assume that dumping firms reduce their dumping margin to cope with the policies. The present study sought to reinvestigate the welfare effects of an antidumping policy when a dumping firm, alternatively, reacts positively with an evading action. The results indicate that the value of an extra evading cost is critical for the dumping firm to choose a reduction in the dumping margin or the exertion of evasive action. Furthermore, under the same evading cost, the larger the market is or the more future benefits the firm envisions, the more likely the firm will choose to evade. When the equilibrium switches from reducing the dumping margin to evasion, the positive welfare effects of an antidumping policy for the importing country will be reduced. If the domestic production cost is higher than that of a foreign firm, the antidumping policy will even result in negative effects on the social welfare of the home country. For the exporting country, the negative effects on welfare will be attenuated when a second period is also pertinent. On this regard, the country with the larger scale of the market should be more careful in executing its antidumping policy.