法律保護、股權結構、多角化與經營績效關聯性之研究

Legal Protection, Stockholder Structure, Diversification and Management Performance Research

王睦舜(Mu-Sun Wang) ； 黃劭彥(Shaio-Yan Huang) ； 林有志(Yu-Chih Lin)

《中華管理學報》 8卷2期 (2007/06) Pp. 61-81

https://doi.org/10.30053/CHJM.200706.0004

摘要

本研究的目的主要在討論法律規範前後，股權結構中的控制股東對經營績效的影響力。這包括大股東持股比例與控制股東對董事會掌握席次的多寡，將足以影響公司管理者的努力意願，他們對增加持股以求與股東利益一致的態度是否可能受著股權結構的影響。本研究的主要三個假設是法律規範後，可能存在著一個管理者最適持股率，而在此最適持股率下管理者對公司的經營績效有正相關，但若超過或低於此持股率，將缺乏顯著相關性；其次本研究從羅吉特迴歸的角度看，控制股東所掌握的席位越多可能對公司的經營績效具良好的預測水準；但是多角化程度越高則市場的預期報酬會越差。不過在研究中發現，支持假說二但不支持假說三，這原因可能是臺灣的上市公司多角化的運作，與前往中國大陸投資有高度相關，本研究並未就此一原因加以分類，值得後續者深入研究之。

關鍵字

經營績效 ； 股權結構 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

This research tries to detect how the control shareholders influence management performance before and after the new law issued. The shareholder's right structure will influence control stockholders. The more stocks control shareholder hold, the more interest consistent with other shareholders. Three main suppositions from this research are that before and after the new law issued, there is a best holding stock rate for managers. There is a positive relationship between the best holding stock rate and management performance. However, if surpasses or lower than this holding stock rate, it will lack significant relevance. In addition, this research use the logit regression to test that controls shareholders grasp more seats from board of directors may improve stakeholders' forecasting capability to company's operating performance. However, the more diversification, the worse the stock market anticipates reward. The result of this research supports the hypothesis two but not to support the hypothesis three. This reason possibly is that Taiwan List Companies diversification operation highly correlated with investment in mainland China. This research does not study this factor, the following researchers are able to continue go through this issue.

並列關鍵字

Management Performance ； Stockholder Structure ； Corporate Governance