個別主義與整體主義

Particularism and Holism

祖旭華(Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu)

《哲學論集》 43期 (2010/07) Pp. 13-32

https://doi.org/10.29699/FJPS.201007.0002

摘要

道德個別主義中心論旨在於反對道德原則在道德領域中扮演任何重要的角色，它認為理由整體主義可以支持這項論旨。在本篇文章中，我將論證：(1)沒有充份理據顯示理由整體主義在道德領域中成立。(2)即便理由整體主義成立，它也不能證成道德個別主義的成立。(3)最後，我將提出一個新的版本的理由整體主義的草案，並說明此理由整體主義有助於我們更清楚地瞭解道德的本性，值得我們在未來做更進一步的探究。

關鍵字

個別主義 ； 整體主義 ； 道德原則

並列摘要

The central tenet of moral particularism lies in its opposition to the claim that moral principles play some essential roles in morality. The particularists argue that their tenet can be supported by the holism of reason. In this paper, I will argue that there is no compelling reason to think that the holism of reason can hold in the realm of ethics and that even if the holism of reason holds, it cannot be used to justify moral particularism. Finally, I will advocate a new version of the holism of reason and argue that it will give us a better grasp of the nature of morality.

並列關鍵字

Particularism ； Holism ； Moral Principle ； Jonathan Dancy

參考文獻

Dancy, Jonathan(2004).Ethics Without Principles.Oxford:Oxford University Press.

McNaughton, David(1988).Moral Vision.Oxford:Blackwell.

Nussbaum, Martha(1990).Love's Knowledge.N.Y.:Oxford University Press.

McDowell, John(2002).Mind, Value & Reality.Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.

Dancy, Jonathan(2000).The Particularist's Progress.Moral Particularism.(Moral Particularism).: