John Duns Scotus' Account of Virtues

董思高的德行觀點

陳德海(Tran Duc Hai)

《哲學論集》 43期 (2010/07) Pp. 33-51

https://doi.org/10.29699/FJPS.201007.0003

摘要

在1250年左右，受到整個「尼可瑪古倫理學」的影響，德行被認為是構成人類生活充實和幸福的元素。因此，當董思高強調把自由意志當作是首要的道德因素時－因為對思高來講，意志是倫理德行的所在－在這裡引起了很多問題，比如：如果這樣的話，德行還佔有什麼空間呢？德行是第二本性的觀念該如何與自由意志結合在一起呢？而它在倫理生活中又扮演怎樣的角色呢？簡單來說，由於思高堅持意志的優先性，他怎樣為倫理善提供一個客觀基礎的證明？
事實上，十三世紀晚期正處在文化脈絡與方法論的危機之內，具體來說，這是為了回應1277年異端的論題，而思高卻堅持要求神聖的自由。因此，他主要的目的不是為了發展一個道德理論，而是為神和人的自由因果做一個解釋。這個解釋造成了一種自由與自然相對的區別，並且引出一個對動力因果關係的優先性。
因此，正當的理性在自由的因果關係之內相連接，這被認為是倫理善的基礎或規範，也意味著德行已不再被視為是構成倫理行為和到達幸福的終極目標。
思高對於德行的說法，可能激起一個人類反思的動機，提供一個以愛作為道德秩序基礎的洞察，促進良知的教育　尤其正當的理性在道德方面中的教育，這些就是為了履行「值得做的或高興做的事情」，這也是對一個自由的人真有意義。

關鍵字

意志 ； 德行 ； 幸福 ； 倫理善 ； 正當的理性 ； 動因 ； 自由 ； 自然 ； 為利益的情感 ； 為正義的情感

並列摘要

With the reception of the entire text of the Nicomachean Ethics in the 1250's., virtues are considered as qualities of life constitutive of human fulfillment and happiness. Therefore, the emphasis of Duns Scotus on the freedom within the will as primary moral element, as the seat of the moral virtues, raises a lot of questions such as: what place this leaves for virtue? How can the conception of virtue as a second nature be reconciled with the freedom of the will? What is then their role in moral life? Briefly, how does Scotus justify an objective basis for moral goodness, given his insistence upon the primacy of the will?
In reality, it is within the cultural milieu and methodological crisis of the late thirteenth century, concretely in response to the heterodox theses of 1277, that Scotus wants to insist upon the divine freedom. Hence, his primary intention is not to develop an ethical theory, but rather a causal explanation of divine and human freedom. This explanation leads to the distinction of free vs. natural and to the preference for efficient causality. Accordingly, right reason, within the articulation of a free causality, is considered as norm or measure for moral goodness, that means the virtues are no longer seen as constituting moral behavior and leading to the ultimate goal of happiness.
Scotus' account of virtue may create an intriguing opportunity for reflection upon the human activity, offer a perspective grounding the moral order on love, and promote the education of the conscience, of the right reason in matters of morality of the agent, in order to do something ”worth doing or enjoying”, something that is significant to the person said to be free.

並列關鍵字

Will ； virtue ； happiness ； moral goodness ； right reason ； the efficient causality ； free ； natural ； affectio commodi ； affectio justitiae

參考文獻

Wolter, Allan B.(trans. Intro.)(1997).Duns Scotus on the will and morality.Washington D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press.

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Bettoni, Efrem,Bonansea, Bernadine(ed. Trans.)(1961).Duns Scotus: The basic principles of his philosophy.Washington D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press.

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Gilson, Etienne(2005).Jean Duns Scot. Introduction a ses positions fondamentales.Paris:Librairie philosophique J.Vrin.