股權結構與創新活動的短視行為

Ownership Structure and Managerial R&D Investment Myopic Behavior

謝純慧(Chun-Hui Hsieh) ； 黃志強(Chih-Chiang Huang) ； 張桓(Huan Chang) ； 曹壽民(Shou-Min Tsao)

《會計學報》 5卷1期 (2013/11) Pp. 97-136

摘要

本研究以2000至2011年間台灣電子業上市（櫃）公司為樣本，分別以「零盈餘」、「前期盈餘」及「分析師預測」為績效門檻，將全體樣本區分為「盈餘小幅度減少」、「盈餘增加」及「盈餘大幅度減少」三群子樣本進行分析。實證顯示（一）全體樣本中，控制股東現金流量權與控制權偏離程度較小的公司，藉刪減研發支出達到短期盈餘目標的可能性將會減少。（二）盈餘小幅度減少樣本中，控制股東現金流量權與控制權偏離程度較小的公司，較無可能發生刪減研發支出達到零盈餘、前期盈餘或分析師預測門檻的短視行為。（三）盈餘增加樣本中，控制股東現金流量權與控制權偏離程度較小的公司，較無可能發生刪減研發支出達到零盈餘或前期盈餘門檻的短視行為。（四）盈餘大幅度減少樣本中，控制股東現金流量權與控制權偏離程度，與刪減研發支出達到盈餘門檻的短視行為無顯著關聯。（五）控制股東現金流量權與刪減研發支出達到盈餘門檻的短視行為無顯著關聯。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 研發支出 ； 盈餘管理 ； 短視行為

並列摘要

The primary objective of this study is to examine whether the ownership structure of Taiwanese electronic industry, measured by the divergence between the ultimate owners' control and the equity ownership level create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (R&D) to achieve certain performance thresholds. These performance thresholds are defined as (1) to report positive profits, that is, to avoid losses; (2) to sustain prior year reported income, in other words, to avoid earnings decreases; (3) to meet analysts' earnings forecast, in short, to satisfy market's expectations. In addition, I also perform linear regression analysis to three subsamples of ＂small decrease＂, ＂increase＂ and ＂large decrease＂ in earnings. The empirical results indicate (1) to entire sample, managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse earnings decline when there is less divergence between the ultimate owners' control rights and cash flow rights; (2) to ＂small decrease＂ subsample, managers are less likely to cut R&D to achieve positive profits, prior year reported income and analysts' earnings forecast when there is less divergence between the ultimate owners' control rights and cash flow rights; (3) to ＂increase＂ subsample, managers are less likely to cut R&D to achieve positive profits and prior year reported income when there is less divergence between the ultimate owners' control rights and cash flow rights; (4) to ＂large decrease＂ subsample, the managers' myopic behavior is irrelevant to the divergence between the ultimate owners' control rights and cash flow rights; (5) there is no significant relation between the factor of cash flow rights and the managers' myopic behavior.

並列關鍵字

Ownership structure ； R&D ； Earnings management ； Managerial myopia

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