主體決定去死—對黑格爾與拉岡主體理論的一種闡釋

The Subject Decides to Die: An Interpretation of Hegel and Lacan's Theories of Subjects

李思逸(Si-Yi Li)

《文化研究雙月報》 147期 (2014/11) Pp. 22-37

摘要

本文試圖在“主體決定去死”這一闡釋視角下，比較、探討黑格爾和拉岡各自理論中涉及到主體與死亡的議題。文章首先將“主體決定去死”界定為個體在持續建構／解構自身主體的過程中主動或“被迫主動”的死亡；隨即梳理這一情境在黑格爾和拉岡各自的主體理論中所可能具有的多層含義；進而通過對電影『維羅妮卡決定去死』的分析，指出拉岡之後的黑格爾辯證主體仍像幽靈一般發揮著作用，甚至可能將大他者變成另一種形式上的絕對主體；最終借助黑格爾主義的拉岡視角對蘇格拉底之死予以解讀，以此論證黑格爾的絕對主體和拉岡的大他者在滿足“主體決定去死”的特定條件時可以被同時消解。

關鍵字

主體 ； 死亡 ； 黑格爾 ； 拉岡

並列摘要

This article aims to compare and investigate Hegel and Lacan's theories of subject and death in the context of ＂the subject decides to die＂. Firstly, I situate ＂the subject decides to die＂ in a position that individuals take, or are forced to take the initiative in death within the construction/deconstruction of their subjects. Secondly, drawing on the Hegelian and Lacanian thoughts on subject and death, I explore the multiple implications of the above situation. Thirdly, through the textual analysis of Veronika Decides to Die, I point out that Hegel's dialectical subject still functions as a specter after Lacan. To some extent, it may even change the Other into a different absolute subject in a higher level of its dialectical movement. In the conclusion, I attempt to offer an interpretation of Socrates' death by contextualizing its place in Lacanian Hegel's horizon, in order to argue that there can be a cancelation of Hegelian absolute subject and Lacanian the Other under certain conditions related to 'the subject decides to die'.

並列關鍵字

subject ； death ； Hegel ； Lacan