Moral Values in the Arts: A Manifesto of Sorts

Joseph Margolis

《Aesthetic Pathways》 1卷1期 (2010/12) Pp. 30-57

https://doi.org/10.29431/AP.201012.0002

並列摘要

I offer an extended argument against the recent tendency in analytic aesthetics to treat our moral interest in the arts and the appraisal of moral judgments and attitudes somehow embodied in actual artworks in terms of an objectivist reading of ”moral” and ”aesthetic” concerns and verdicts. I don't object to the verdictive mode of our conversations about the arts, but I see no basis for believing that we actually possess, or can demonstrate, an objective distinction between ”moral” and ”aesthetic” concerns or cognitive grounds for reading objective verdicts of the pertinent sorts. I sample a good many literary and filmic specimens in the course of testing the pretensions in question, particularly as developed in the accounts advanced by Berys Gaut and Noël Carroll, and I offer in their stead a much laxer and (I think) more plausible picture of what can be defended in our appraisive and appreciative practice.

並列關鍵字

aesthetics ； Carroll ； film ； Gaut ； literature ； moral