利益輸送代理問題和股權結構之理論與實證研究

Wealth Exploitation and Ownership Structure-A Study of Agency Theory on Taiwan Stock Market

葉銀華(Yin-Hua Yeh) ； 邱顯比(Shean-Bii Chiu) ； 何憲章(Hsien-Chan Ho)

《中國財務學刊》 4卷4期 (1997/04) Pp. 47-73

https://doi.org/10.6545/JoFS.1997.4(4).3

摘要

利益輸送為股權代理問題的一種型式。何憲章、邱顯比和葉銀華（民83）擴展Leland和Pyle（1977）的理論模型，建立利益輸送金額與管理當局持股比率、公司特定風險、未來現金流量以及處罰成本等四個假說。利用臺灣與美國證券市場之結構性差異，來說明臺灣因為處罰成本較低，而使利益輸送的情況較為嚴重。再者，利用關係人股權與土地交易金額，當成利益輸送的實證變數，驗證其餘假說。實證結果發現，關係人交易金頓與管理當局持股比率，產生轉折區間，支持假說一。而關係人交易金額與公司特定風險的正向關係得到部分的支持。另外，採用負債比率為控制變數，其與關係人交易金額之負向關係亦得到大部分的支持。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 代理理論 ； 利益輸送

並列摘要

This paper tests empirically the relation between ownership structure and wealth exploitation on small shareholders. The theoretic model is based on Ho. Chiu and Yeh (1994) that extend s Leland and Pyle (1977) to include the possibility that manager may exploit corporate wealth through transactions with affiliated companies and / or individuals. Consistent with the model predictions, the empirical results show that the relation between managerial stock holdings and wealth exploitation is not monotonic. The amounts of wealth exploitation rise with managerial stock holdings before the break point that mimic the point where management obtains full power to process transactions with affiliated parties. When the managerial stock holdings exceed the break point, the amounts of wealth exploitation fall with further increases in the holding ratios.

並列關鍵字

ownership structure ； agency theory ； wealth exploitation