新上市公司股票之發行折價－代理成本與公司控制之研究

The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings with Respect to Agency Cost and Corporate Control

陳安琳(An-Lin Chen) ； 李文智(Wen-Chih Lee) ； 林宗源(Tsung-Yuan Lin)

《中國財務學刊》 6卷3期 (1999/01) Pp. 1-23

https://doi.org/10.6545/JoFS.1999.6(3).1

摘要

本研究從代理理論、訊息傳遞假設與公司控制權的角度來探討董事會持股比例與新上市公司股票（initial public offerings, IPOs）折價程度之關係。財務學上在探討自變數與應變數間非筒單的線性關係時，常誤用Morck，Shleifer and Vishny（1988）分段式迴歸式上的處理方式，誤用的結果使得所估計得的迴歸線有跳空（jump）的現象。本研究則修正Morck et al.的誤用模式，實證結果顯示董事會持股比例及董事長與總經理持股比例以及法人在董監事的持股比例愈高則IPOs折價程度愈低，這個結果與代理理論一致。但是從公司控制的角度來驗證兩者的關係時卻呈現不顯著的關係。這可能是因為台灣股票市場中，股權集中程度較大，且新上市公司在上市之初並沒有股權爭奪的現象所致。

關鍵字

新上市公司股票 ； 代理問題 ； 公司控制 ； 折價 ； 分段式迴歸

並列摘要

This paper investigates the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) from the angles of agency theory, signaling hypothesis, and corporate control theory. The piecewise regression was typically mis-used in previous finance studies and experienced an econometric error causing a jump in the estimated regression line and leading to the biased coefficients of the regression. In this paper, we revise the piecewise regression model to avoid the econometric error to investigate the relationship between the IPO underpricing and the ownership structure of IPO firm s. The erripirical results show that the higher the management ownership or the institution al ownership the less underpriced the IPOs. These results are consistent with the concept of agency theory. However, we do not reject a monotonic relationship between the management ownership and the extent of (PO underpricing from the point of view of corporate control.

並列關鍵字

Initial public offerings ； Agency problem ； Corporate control ； Underpricing ； Piecewi seregression