敵意接管、反接管策略與權益代理成本間理論關係之探討

Hostile Takeover, Antitakeover and Equity Agency Problem: A Theoretical Model

葉銀華(Yin-Hua Yeh) ； 魯慧中(Huei-Chung Lu) ； 高樹嘉(Shu-Chia Kao)

《中國財務學刊》 6卷3期 (1999/01) Pp. 69-98

https://doi.org/10.6545/JoFS.1999.6(3).4

摘要

本文旨在探討敵意接管與反接管措施對於權益代理問題的影響，藉以分析公司控制權市場的競爭在公司監理機制所扮演的角色。在模型建構上，本文將X-無效率（或特權消費）和利益輸送二項權益代理問題，加入Hirshleifer和Titman（1990）的股票購買要約（tender offer）與反接管措施的模型中。模型推導結果發現：（1）當管理當局的經營能力愈低與公司監理機制愈不健全。則管理當局的權益代理問題愈嚴重且購併成功機率愈高。（2）購併者在接管前持股比率愈高，則購併成功機率愈高。（3）當購併者以二階段股票購買要約進行敵意接管時。將可降低標的公司X-無效率的權益代理問題。（4）標的公司採取毒藥丸與焦土政策進行反接管時，將使敵意接管成功機率降低，再者，本文針對模型所推導之命題，進一步闡述其實證的涵義。

關鍵字

權益代理問題 ； 敵意接管 ； 反接管措施 ； 公司控制權市場

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of competition in the corporate control market upon the corporate governance mechanism by investigating the influence of hostile takeover and anti takeover measures upon the equity agency problem. This study extends the tender offer and antitakeover model proposed by Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) by adding equity agency problem, X-inefficiency (perquisites) and wealth exploitation. The main result s derived from the model include (1) Low management ability of target company, and unsound of corporate governance will deteriorate the equity agency problem of the target company, in turn, the sucessful probability of takeover is high. (2) The higher shareholding percent age of the bidder before takeover is, the higher the sucessful probability of takeover is. (3) The action of bidder undertaking the hostile takeover by the two-tiered tender offer, will decrease the Xinefficiency (perquisites) of the target companies. (4) If the target companies undertake the poison pill and scorched earth to antitakeover, the sucessful probability of hostile takeover will be reduced. Moreover, we derive some propositions through building the theoretical model, and empirical implication embedded in the propositions were explicitly discussed.

並列關鍵字

equity agency problem ； hostile takeover ； antitakeover ； corporate control market