- 期刊
檢驗「自願投保」存款保險制度下的「逆向選擇」與「道德危機」問題：以台灣區農會信用部為例
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Deposit Insurance System: Evidence from Taiwan's Credit Department of Farmers' Institutions
摘要
台灣的存款保險制度從開辦以來至民國87年均是採行自願投保及固定保險費率，本質上兼具逆向選擇與道德危機的誘因，本文嘗試以台灣地區農會信用部為樣本，探討此存款保險制度是否產生逆向選擇與道德危機兩個問題。實證結果顯示，存保開辦初期即加入的農會信用部，並非屬於風險較高的一群；同樣的結果亦發生於彰化四信風波之後才加入存保的農會信用部，因此逆向選擇的情況並未顯著發生。在道德危機方面，若以「流動性比率」與「逾放比率」作為衡量風險的替代變數，則農會信用部會隨著加入存保的時間增加而提高其所承擔的風險。
並列摘要
Since the deposit insurance system of Taiwan was enacted in 1985, it was run under a voluntary basis with a fixed insurance premium rate till 1998. As any kind of insurance, the system is very likely to emerge the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in essence. By using the data of the credit department of farmers' institutions (CDFIs) in Taiwan, this paper attempts to identify whether the deposit insurance induced the problems of advers e selection and moral hazard. The empirical result shows that CDFIs with relatively small size tend to join deposit insurance first, but it is not significant that they belong to the risk-prone group. Moreover, compared with the uninsured CDFIs, those joined deposit insurance in the years of 1995 and 1996 are big in size and with lower ratio of over-due loan to total loan. Thus, evidence concludes the problem of adverse selection did not emerge. As regards moral hazard, we find that the risk of CDFIs is increasing after joining deposit insurance when the risk is measured by the ratio of over-du e loan to total loan and by the ratio of liquidity.