影響董事會獨立性之決定因素

The Determinants of Board Independence

李伶珠(Ling-Chu Lee)

《國立屏東商業技術學院學報》 15期 (2013/07) Pp. 121-148

摘要

本文從鞏固利益觀點與股東價值最佳化觀點，探討影響董事會獨立性之因素。從鞏固利益觀點來看，預期公司在控制股東之現金流量權與控制權偏離度較高、董監股權質押比率較高、或屬於家族企業情況下，公司之經營團隊傾向逃避被監督，聘任獨立董事的意願較低。從股東價值最佳化來看，公司因應成長而有資金需求或配合機構法人要求等情況下，聘任獨立董事的效益較高，公司聘任獨立董事的意願也會較強。研究結果發現，當控制股東之現金流量權與控制權偏離度或董監股權質押比率越高時，則董事會的獨立性越低，較支持鞏固利益之觀點。其次，當機構投資人之持股比率越高，則董事會的獨立性越高。

關鍵字

監督 ； 董事會 ； 獨立性

並列摘要

Using the entrenchment view and shareholder optimization view, this study explores the determinants of board independence. According to the entrenchment view, this study predicts under three cases, (1) the divergence between the equity ownership level and the ultimate owner's control is higher, (2) the pledged shares of controlling owners are greater, and (3) the company is controlled by a family, that management tends to avoid being monitored, and thus the company prefers not to appoint independent directors. According to the shareholder optimization view, companies acquire more benefits from hiring more independent directors when they need capital for future growth or are required to do by institutional investors. Therefore, companies are more likely to hire more independent directors. The empirical results support the entrenchment view and show that when there is a higher divergence between the equity ownership level and the ultimate owner's control, or when the pledged shares of controlling owners are greater, the level of board independence will be lower. In addition, the more shares held by institutional investors, the higher the level of board independence will be.

並列關鍵字

Monitoring ； Board of Directors ； Independence