個人資料保護法第41條「違法侵害個資罪」之基本課題－以最高法院109年度台上大字第1869號刑事裁定的檢討為契機

The Basic Research of Penal Provision in Art.41 of Personal Data Protection Act-In the Context of the Criminal Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court: Tai-Shang-Da-Zi Decision No. 1869 (2020)

簡至鴻(Chih-Hung Chien)

《刑事政策與犯罪防治研究專刊》 32期 (2022/08) Pp. 131-184

https://doi.org/10.6460/CPCP.202208_(32).03

摘要

以最高法院109年度台上大字第1869號刑事裁定的作成為契機，本文藉由分析本件大法庭裁定見解的論理構成，進一步突顯個人資料保護法第41條違法侵害個資罪在解釋適用上的課題與其問題結構。申言之，本件大法庭見解雖然是以違法侵害個資罪中，有關意圖要件所指涉「利益」的範疇作為解釋對象，然則對於此一法律問題的理解，實與本罪保護法益的實質內容以及與之相應表徵法益侵害態樣的行為類型內涵密不可分。基此問題意識，本文首先從本件大法庭裁定作成的脈絡出發，對照現行判決實務對於違法侵害個資罪中「意圖」與「足生損害」等要件的解釋態度，考察其對於本罪行為類型的理解與適用傾向（貳、）。進而，在釐清判決實務於解釋適用上所呈現出的問題圖式基礎上，本文試圖藉由檢討、定性違法侵害個資罪的保護法益內涵與侵害態樣，亦即，以高度資訊化社會脈絡下的「資料庫監控」隱私侵害型態為中心，進一步探求本罪行為類型的限定解釋方向（參、）。最後，總結上述考察與分析所得，並以之初步回應本件大法庭見解所突顯出，違法侵害個資罪在解釋適用上的基本課題（肆、）。

關鍵字

最高法院109年度台上大字第1869號刑事裁定 ； 資訊隱私 ； 資訊自決權 ； 目的犯 ； 行為足生損害

並列摘要

The main purpose of this treatise is to clarify the issue of Art. 41 of the Personal Data Protection Act, which criminalized purposely acquiring, processing or utilizing personal data without the legitimate reasons. We could say that, the judgement on act of committing crime of this code is reduced to mere form, as revealed by the 2020 Tai-Shang-Da-Zi Decision No. 1869 of the Criminal Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. This controversial issues could be stated in two significant figures. First, the essence of personal data breach is absent of criminology reality. Namely, the definition for ＂encroaching on information privacy＂ or ＂injury to personality right＂ as a criminal act is ambiguous and lacks clarity in judicial practice. Secondly, as regards the application of the legal requisites of this criminal act, it could be explained in certain formalized ways. Especially, we could see the cases about the defamation by using one's personal data, which might be lack of relevance in infringement of right to informational self-determination, but still are accused guilty on the court. Therefore, to confront with this dilemma, I would illustrate the essential meaning of the crime of encroaching on information privacy in terms of legal protection analysis. In that way, I suggest a feasible approach to interpret this crime based on the content of the ＂dataveillance＂, which can be used to restrict the boundary of the application of this crime. As a consequence, the structure of judgement on this crime can be shown accordingly.

並列關鍵字

2020 Tai-Shang-Da-Zi Decision No. 1869 of the Criminal Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court ； Information Privacy ； Right to Informational Self-determination ； Criminal Offences Committed with Intention ； the Act May Result in Damage

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