湛然的「無情有佛性」論與佛性的「主體性」問題

Zhanran's Doctrine of ＂the Buddha-nature of Insentient Beings＂ and the Question of the Subjectivity of Buddha-nature

唐秀連(Tong Sau Lin)

《禪與人類文明研究》 1期 (2016/12) Pp. 209-239

摘要

天台宗九祖荊溪湛然因為「無情有佛性」說而聞名。本文從佛性的「主體性」問題入手，總結出他對「佛性具有實在的體性，唯有情獨有」這一見地的批判。湛然認為，不但有情有佛性，事實上，連無情也有佛性。本文認為，湛然「草木有性」說的目的，不在於貶損如來藏清淨心的尊貴性和主體能動性，而是修正單純的唯心論可能對心性孤絕於萬法之外的「超絕性」的妄執，緣此世人亦可避免掉入世俗認知方式中「佛性」觀念可能蘊藏的自我中心窠臼。不過，宣稱無情有性並不等如認同草木可各別成佛，故「無情有性」與「無情成佛」，應當分而論之。

關鍵字

湛然 ； 無情有性 ； 佛性 ； 主體性 ； 天台宗

並列摘要

Jingxi Zhanran, the ninth patriarch of the Tiantai School of Chinese Buddhism, is well-known for advocating the doctrine of ＂the Buddhanature of insentient beings.＂ By raising the question about subjectivity, this paper examines Zhanran's criticism of the notion that Buddhahood has a substantial nature which only sentient beings can embrace. On the basis of his critique on the illusory thoughts in relation to the substance of Buddha-nature, Zhanran, in contrast with the common belief harboured by most of the Buddhist scholars of his time, articulates that not only sentient beings but also insentient ones, e.g., flora, mountains, rivers, and manmade objects, have Buddha-nature. This paper ultimately argues that Zhanran proposes the Buddhanature of insentient beings not with the aim of diminishing the nobility and subjective initiative of tathāgata-garbha, but with a view to transcending the duality between selfness and otherness, and subjectivity and objectivity. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy that Zhanran's advocacy of insentience's Buddha-nature should not be viewed as equivalent to the proposition that all insentient beings such as trees, grass and flowers are allowed to attain Buddhahood.

並列關鍵字

Zhanran ； the Buddha-nature of insentient beings ； Buddhanature ； Subjectivity ； Tiantai School