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Research on Network False Public Opinion Regulatory Countermeasures from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

摘要


False sensation emerges in today's cyberspace, which has a very negative impact on the good development of China's network environment. Through the use of evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of government, network platform and false public opinion makers, and explores the impact of netizen groups on the equilibrium results of the entire game model. Through Jacobian matrix analysis, the main factors affecting the choice of game subjects are discussed, and the conditions for behavior strategies to be stable are discussed. The research shows that the Internet platform, false public opinion makers and netizens have certain autonomy to the false information of the network. The governance effect depends largely on the media literacy level of the netizens; only when the netizen's media literacy level is low. The government's participation in the network's false information governance is more effective. Finally, based on the above results, long-term and short-term recommendations are made for the false grievances of the government governance network.

參考文獻


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