The Governance Effect of Short Selling on M&A Performance

Na Yin

《Frontiers in Economics and Management》 3卷3期 (2022/03) Pp. 138-142

https://doi.org/10.6981/FEM.202203_3(3).0016

摘要

This paper takes Chinese A-share listed margin trading and short selling companies from 2010 to 2019 as research samples to explore the governance effect of short selling pressure on corporate M&A performance. This paper finds that short-selling pressure has a significant positive impact on the short-term M&A performance of enterprises, and the greater the short-selling pressure, the better the short-term M&A performance of enterprises. This paper not only provides micro-empirical evidence for the relaxation of short selling constraints in China, but also provides a new idea for firms to improve M&A performance and restrain managers' behavior.

關鍵字

Short Selling ； M&A Performance ； Restrain

參考文獻

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