政黨輪替後兩岸關係之談判架構分析

Negotiation Framework Analysis of Cross-Strait Relations after Regime Turnover

郭浩明(Hao-Ming, Kuo)

指導教授 ： 江炯聰

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.00011

摘要

兩岸關係一直是近十數年間影響台灣政局的最重要因素，從國民黨執政後期的本土化到民進黨的執政時的台獨主張，兩岸關係更走向前所未有的緊張局勢。

本研究是以學術界現有的談判架構，用系統化方式，將影響談判相關之因素一一呈現，分析兩岸談判中造成僵局的主要原因與可能的發展，以及達成協議的雙方必要的作法。

兩岸談判陷入僵局的主要徵結在於中共堅持「一個中國」原則，而民進黨卻在根本上否定「九二共識」的存在，在這種雙方認知差距過大的情形下，自然無法出現所謂的可能協議區間(ZOPA)，雙方唯有相互讓步才有可能達成協議。

就賽局的理論說，這是在靜態上的一個囚犯困境(Prisoner’s Dilemma)，而呈現各自堅持，彼此都得到較差的結果。但以兩岸來說，實際上是動態的連續性賽局(Repeat Game)，在相互的溝通與逐漸建立共識的情形下，可以找到達成協議的可能性。不過連續性賽局的最重要的就是雙方領導人的信譽(Credit)問題，在這一點上無疑的陳水扁總統的前後言行不一，做事反覆的風格將對談判的順利進行有重大的影響。

如果以談判角度來分析，兩岸關係短時間內應難有太多的實質進展，而相較於大陸經濟的蓬勃發展，台灣的經濟優勢正在快速的消退之中，為了台灣永續的發展，在美國的保證下，兩岸簽定三十到五十年的「不獨不武」的中程協議應是一個不錯的解決方案，藉由區域經濟的整合發展，逐漸增進彼此的了解，建立彼此的共識，進而解決兩岸的僵局。

關鍵字

兩岸關係 ； 一個中國原則 ； 九二共識 ； 談判 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

The Cross-Strait relationship is always the most important factor for the Taiwan political situation in the past decade. After DPP became the ruling party of Taiwan, because it’s “Taiwan Independence” statement, the Cross-Strait tensions are getting higher.

This research will base on existing negotiation theory, using the negotiation framework to do the systematic for the Cross-Strait relationship, in order to understand the reason why negotiation became deadlock, and try to analysis how it can reach agreement.

The major reason of Cross-Strait relationship became deadlock, is because CPC(Communist Party of China) insist on it’s “one China Principle”, but DPP denies the “1992 consensus” fundamentally. this big gap of the perception between both side is causing the difficulties to have a Zone of Possible Agreement(ZOPA) existed, the only way to reach the agreement is both side have to reduce their walkaway conditions.

From the Game Theory point of view, Cross-Strait relations is definitely a prisoner’s dilemma if it is a static game, both side will get the worse result because they are all only consider their own interest, and then because the deadlock. But Cross-Strait relations is a dynamic repeat game actually, from each contact cycle, both side will have more understand or will be possible to built consensus, eventually their will create the ZOPA and reach agreement. But in the repeat game, the credibility of the negotiator is very important factor for the negotiation, because whether the negotiator’s behavior can be trust or not , will influence the both side to reach agreement. At this point, President Chen Shui-Bian’s credit is a big question mark, and will seriously influence the negotiation progress.

From the negotiation point of view, Cross-Strait relations can’t have real progress in the short time, Mianland China’s economic is blooming for the past quarter; but for the past years, the economical advantage of Taiwan faded out quickly. For the better future of Taiwan, Both side sign a medium range agreement so call “No Taiwan independence, no military conflict” for the period lasting for 30 to 50 years under US’s intervene, will be a constructive resolution, though the regional economical integration, improve the understanding and build the consensus of each other gradually, eventually the political deadlock issue of Cross-Strait can be solved.

並列關鍵字

Cross-Strait Relations ； one China principle ； 1992 consensus ； negotiation ； game theory.

參考文獻

1、Michael Watkins, Susan Rosegrant, Breakthrough InternationalNegotiations (2001)

3、H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation,

4、Michael Watkins, Breakthrough Business Negotiation, Jossey-Bass,(2002)

5、J. Sebenius “Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review”

6、R. Fisher, W. Ury, and B. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiation Agreement