在信用擔保機制下供應商具有不確定性時議價模式之研究

A Bargaining Model with Supply Uncertainty under Credit Guarantee Mechanism

吳政原(Zheng-Yuan Wu)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.00103

摘要

為了滿足顧客訂單，現今供應鏈發展模式往往由一規模較大的零售商採取外包的方式將訂單交付給許多規模較小的供應商進行生產；然而這些規模小的供應商在生產、完成訂單需求的過程中常面臨到資金不足的窘境，可能無法順利交貨、違約的情況產生，影響整體供應鏈的營運與利益，因此如何協助這些小供應商能順利取得資金，使供應鏈能順利運作，是一個重要的議題。
過去在台灣，政府已和銀行合作成立中小企業信用保證基金會，利用信用擔保的方式實行所謂的「火金姑專案模式」，目的是希望透過信用擔保，分式散風險的概念使得供應鏈裡的廠商能有效取得資金，提高營運效率。
是以本研究目的在以供應鏈的角度出發運用「火金姑專案」的精神去探討信用擔保機制，協助供應商進行融資，企圖建立一種新的信用擔保機制，同時本研究也將透過這個模式進一步探討上下游間的議價行為，在此機制下由供應鏈的下游且通常規模較大的零售商為信用擔保機制的發起者。這樣的模式排除了政府的角色，由零售商幫供應商向銀行做信用擔保使得供應商能有較低的資金成本，使整體供應鏈的效用上升。
本研究的研究結果顯示供應商與零售商應更緊密合作，如此才能增進整體供應鏈利益，使雙方效用增加；此外零售商與銀行應更謹慎議定貸款成數，過高或過低的貸款成數都將損害整體供應鏈的利益。

關鍵字

中小企業 ； 信用擔保機制 ； 火金姑專案

並列摘要

Nowadays, supply chain usually develops a model to fulfill the customer’s order. The model is the retailer with larger scale outsources the order to the smaller supplier to meet the customer’s demand.
Unfortunately, suppliers often face the problem of lacking financial support, which leads them unable to deliver their product to retailer on time or to violate the contract. It will erode the whole supply chain’s operation effectiveness and its own profit. How to help those suppliers get the financial support without difficulty and to avoid the above situation is a crucial issue.
The research bases on the model named “Firefly Counterpart Guarantee” attempting to use the basic framework to build a whole new credit guarantee mechanism. Besides, under the mechanism we discuss the bargaining behavior between the supplier and the retailer. The new mechanism begins from the retailer who founded credit guarantee for supplier actively. Follow the way it can remove of the role government played and Let the supplier can borrow the financial support from bank with lower interest rate and cost because of the retailer’s credit guarantee. By this mechanism it can also help increase the total supply chain’s profit and welfare.
The research shows that the retailer and the supplier should cooperate much more tightly to increase the whole supply chin’s profit. Besides, the retailer and the bank should pay much more attention while they are deciding the loan-to-value (LTV) since value of LTV no matter too high or too law will both damage the whole supply chain’s profit severely.

並列關鍵字

Small and Medium Enterprise ； Credit Guarantee ； Firefly Counterpart Guarantee

參考文獻

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