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  • 學位論文

零售商與製造商最適訂價策略與消費者價格協商

Customers Negotiation and Optimal Pricing Strategies of the Manufacturer and the Retailer

指導教授 : 郭瑞祥 蔣明晃 郭佳瑋

摘要


在現今消費者交易行為中,議價已經是相當普遍且常見的消費者行為。在本研究中,我們探討當市場上同時存在有兩種不同的消費者 -- 價格協商者與價格接受者,不同的價格協商者佔市場消費總人口比例與價格協商者相對於零售商的議價能力,會如何影響零售商甚至是製造商的訂價行為。本研究建立一簡單的供應鏈模型,假設在此供應鏈中僅存在一個製造商與一個零售商,零售商向製造商購買產品並販售給兩種購買行為不同的消費者,在我們的模型參數假設下,我們可以找出零售商與製造商的最適訂價。我們發現價格協商者相對於零售商的議價能力越大,零售商所能接受的最低價格會隨之提升;而價格協商者佔總消費者人口比例越高,對於零售商所設定的價格與零售商所能接受的最低價格都會增加。除此之外,我們發現了一個有趣的現象:在均衡的情況下,當具有議價行為的消費者占總消費人口比例增加時,零售商所制定的產品價格與零售商願意接受的最低售價的變動方向,在不同的情境下是不一致的。當消費者最高願付價格高、議價成本低、以及議價者議價成本與其願付價格的關係較小的情況下,零售商的最適價格與價格協商者佔總消費人口的比例有負向相關。反之,則呈現相反的結果。

並列摘要


In this thesis, we consider a stylized supply chain in which there exist one manufacturer and one retailer. We propose a model discussing how the fraction of the bargainers in customer population and the relative bargaining power of the bargainers influence the retailer and the manufacturer’s optimal prices when the bargainers and the price-takers co-exist in the market. We characterize the optimal posted price, the optimal cut-off price, and the optimal wholesale price, as the functions of the model parameters. We find the lowest price that the retailer is willing to sell is increasing with the relative bargaining power of the bargainers; both the posted price and the lowest price that the retailer is willing to sell are increasing with the fraction of the bargainers in customer population. In addition, we also find an interesting result that when the highest reservation price of the is large, and/or the negotiation costs, and/or α is small, the posted price and the lowest price that the retailer is willing to sell are negative related to the fraction of the bargainers in customer population.

參考文獻


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